Zapros has an Unbounded Content-Encoding decompression chain that allows denial of serviceGHSA-5vjj-2r48-q622
Fix: kap-sh/zapros@7971fbcGHSA-5vjj-2r48-q622 is a CWE-770 vulnerability in zapros. A fix is available for zapros — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-5vjj-2r48-q622.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
zaprosReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
Who is impacted:
- Any application using Zapros to make HTTP requests to untrusted servers
- Applications that follow redirects to attacker-controlled hosts
Attack vector:
- A malicious HTTP server returns a response with many chained content encodings. When the client attempts to decode, it creates a deeply nested decompression chain consuming excessive resources.
Patches
Fixed in version 0.14.0.
The fix adds a hardcoded limit of 5 Content-Encoding layers. Responses exceeding this limit raise DecodingError.
Workarounds
Add middleware that checks for a malicious Content-Encoding header.
from typing import cast
from zapros import (
AsyncBaseHandler,
AsyncBaseMiddleware,
BaseHandler,
BaseMiddleware,
Client,
DecodingError,
Request,
Response,
)
MAX_DECODE_LAYERS = 5
class ContentEncodingCheckMiddleware(BaseMiddleware, AsyncBaseMiddleware):
def __init__(
self,
next_handler: BaseHandler | AsyncBaseHandler,
*,
max_layers: int = MAX_DECODE_LAYERS,
) -> None:
self.next = cast(BaseHandler, next_handler)
self.async_next = cast(AsyncBaseHandler, next_handler)
self._max_layers = max_layers
def _check(self, response: Response) -> None:
encoding_header = response.headers.get("Content-Encoding")
if not encoding_header:
return
layers = [enc.strip().lower() for enc in encoding_header.split(",") if enc.strip()]
if len(layers) > self._max_layers:
raise DecodingError(f"Too many Content-Encoding layers ({len(layers)}), maximum is {self._max_layers}")
def handle(self, request: Request) -> Response:
response = self.next.handle(request)
self._check(response)
return response
async def ahandle(self, request: Request) -> Response:
response = await self.async_next.ahandle(request)
self._check(response)
return response
with Client().wrap_with_middleware(lambda next: ContentEncodingCheckMiddleware(next)) as client:
...
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | zapros | all versions | 0.14.0pip install --upgrade 'zapros==0.14.0' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for zapros, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update zapros to 0.14.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5vjj-2r48-q622 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5vjj-2r48-q622 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.