GHSA-5vgj-ggm4-fg62 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.2) vulnerability in pdoc. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for pdoc — see the affected versions and patch details below.
pdoc embeds link to malicious CDN if math mode is enabled
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-5vgj-ggm4-fg62.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-5vgj-ggm4-fg62 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
pdocReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
Documentation generated with pdoc --math linked to JavaScript files from polyfill.io.
The polyfill.io CDN has been sold and now serves malicious code.
Users who produce documentation with math mode should update immediately. All other users are unaffected.
Patches
This issue has been fixed in pdoc 14.5.1.
References
https://github.com/mitmproxy/pdoc/pull/703 https://sansec.io/research/polyfill-supply-chain-attack
Timeline
- [2024-06-25] https://sansec.io/research/polyfill-supply-chain-attack is published.
- [2024-06-25 20:54 UTC] Issue reported to the pdoc project by @adhintz.
- [2024-06-25 21:33 UTC] Patched version released.
- [2024-06-25 21:37 UTC] Security advisory published.
- [2024-06-25 23:49 UTC] CVE-2024-38526 assigned by GitHub.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | pdoc | all versions | 14.5.1pip install --upgrade 'pdoc==14.5.1' |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pdoc, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update pdoc to 14.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5vgj-ggm4-fg62 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-5vgj-ggm4-fg62 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-5vgj-ggm4-fg62. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5vgj-ggm4-fg62 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-5vgj-ggm4-fg62 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.