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GHSA-5v93-9mqw-p9mh

Uncaught Panic in ORML Rewards Pallet

Published
Feb 14, 2025
Updated
Feb 14, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🦀orml-rewards

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A vulnerability in the add_share function of the Rewards pallet (part of the ORML repository) can lead to an uncaught Rust panic when handling user-provided input exceeding the u128 range.

Affected Components

  • ORML Rewards pallet (rewards/src/lib.rs)
  • Any Substrate-based chain using ORML Rewards with add_share accepting unvalidated large u128 inputs

Technical Details

  • add_share performs arithmetic on user-supplied values (add_amount) of type T::Share (mapped to u128 in Acala).
  • If add_amount is large enough (e.g., i128::MAX), the intermediate result may overflow and panic on the cast to u128.
  • Validation occurs only after arithmetic, enabling a crafted input to trigger an overflow.

Impact

A malicious user submitting a specially crafted extrinsic can cause a panic in the runtime:

  • Denial of Service by crashing the node process.
  • Potential for invalid blocks produced by validators.

Likelihood

This issue is exploitable in production if there exists at least one rewards pool where reward tokens exceed twice the collateral tokens, allowing sufficiently large multiplication to exceed u128 bounds.

Remediation

Backport

The patch have been backported to following release branches:

  • polkadot-stable2407
  • polkadot-stable2409

A 1.0.1 patch release is made with this fix.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.ioorml-rewardsall versions1.2.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for orml-rewards. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update orml-rewards to 1.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5v93-9mqw-p9mh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5v93-9mqw-p9mh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-5v93-9mqw-p9mh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary A vulnerability in the `add_share` function of the **Rewards** pallet (part of the ORML repository) can lead to an uncaught Rust panic when handling user-provided input exceeding the `u128` range. ## Affected Components - **ORML Rewards** pallet (`rewards/src/lib.rs`) - Any Substrate-based chain using ORML Rewards with `add_share` accepting unvalidated large `u128` inputs ## Technical Details - `add_share` performs arithmetic on user-supplied values (`add_amount`) of type `T::Share` (mapped to `u128` in Acala). - If `add_amount` is large enough (e.g., `i128::MAX`), the intermediat
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-5v93-9mqw-p9mh in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-5v93-9mqw-p9mh across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.