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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988

MEDIUM

GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.2) CWE-835 vulnerability in OpenMcdf. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

OpenMcdf: Uncatchable infinite loop in DirectoryTree.TryGetDirectoryEntry on crafted CFB directory cycle

Also known asCVE-2026-45785
Published
May 19, 2026
Updated
May 19, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 14, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs3th percentile — riskier than 3% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 360,399 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
.NETOpenMcdf

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The BST name-lookup loop in DirectoryTree.TryGetDirectoryEntry (OpenMcdf/DirectoryTree.cs:35-46) walks directory entries by repeatedly calling directories.TryGetSibling(child, siblingType, validateColor). A crafted CFB file with cyclic Left/Right sibling links among directory entries - constructed so the per-step BST-order check in TryGetSibling (DirectoryEntries.cs:84-85) is satisfied at every step - drives this while (child is not null) loop forever. There is no cycle detection in TryGetDirectoryEntry.

Details

The recent Brent's-algorithm commit (24f445a) protects DirectoryTreeEnumerator and works correctly for both attached repros - pure EnumerateEntries() throws FileFormatException: Directory tree contains a loop cleanly. The unprotected code path is the lookup-by-name loop, which is reached from multiple public APIs:

  • RootStorage.OpenStorage(name) / TryOpenStorage(name)
  • RootStorage.OpenStream(name) / TryOpenStream(name)

The second one matters most: typical consumers iterate EnumerateEntries() and call OpenStream(entry.Name) per Stream entry. With Brent's algorithm catching the enumeration cycle but not the per-entry lookup, callers can still hang as soon as they touch a streamed entry.

PoC

Two minimal repros attached, demonstrating the same lookup-loop bug reached via two different public APIs:

  • repro_lookup.cfb (5,632 bytes) - hangs on direct OpenStorage(name) for a name not present in the directory
  • repro_enumerate.cfb (7,936 bytes) - hangs on OpenStream(entry.Name) called for an entry returned by EnumerateEntries() (the common consumer pattern)

Repro 1 - OpenStorage(name)

using OpenMcdf;

using var fs = File.OpenRead("repro_lookup.cfb");
using var root = RootStorage.Open(fs);
root.TryOpenStorage("__substg1.0_3001001F", out _);
// process spins at 100% CPU; Ctrl+C required.

Repro 2 - OpenStream from inside an enumeration loop

using OpenMcdf;

using var fs = File.OpenRead("repro_enumerate.cfb");
using var root = RootStorage.Open(fs);
foreach (var entry in root.EnumerateEntries())   // safe: Brent's catches enumeration cycles
{
    if (entry.Type == EntryType.Stream)
        _ = root.OpenStream(entry.Name);          // hangs: lookup path has no cycle detection
}

Both processes will not terminate.

(Note: pure foreach (var entry in root.EnumerateEntries()) { } with no per-entry lookup is safe - Brent's algorithm in DirectoryTreeEnumerator catches the enumeration cycle and throws FileFormatException: Directory tree contains a loop. The hang only manifests once a name lookup is performed.)

repros.zip

Impact

A denial of service affecting any application that opens untrusted CFB files with OpenMcdf. A small crafted input with a cyclic directory tree reaches the unprotected BST name-lookup in DirectoryTree.TryGetDirectoryEntry, hit by any caller of OpenStorage / TryOpenStorage / OpenStream / TryOpenStream - including the very common pattern of iterating EnumerateEntries() and calling OpenStream(entry.Name) per Stream entry. The cycles bypass the per-step BST-order check in TryGetSibling, so no exception is thrown and try/catch cannot protect callers. The affected thread is unrecoverable without killing the process. Downstream CFB consumers (e.g. .msg-file parsers) inherit transitively.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
.NETNuGetOpenMcdfall versions3.1.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for OpenMcdf. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update OpenMcdf to 3.1.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The BST name-lookup loop in `DirectoryTree.TryGetDirectoryEntry` (`OpenMcdf/DirectoryTree.cs:35-46`) walks directory entries by repeatedly calling `directories.TryGetSibling(child, siblingType, validateColor)`. A crafted CFB file with cyclic Left/Right sibling links among directory entries - constructed so the per-step BST-order check in `TryGetSibling` (`DirectoryEntries.cs:84-85`) is satisfied at every step - drives this `while (child is not null)` loop forever. There is no cycle detection in `TryGetDirectoryEntry`. ### Details The recent Brent's-algorithm commit ([`24f445a`](ht
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988 across NuGet dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988: OpenMcdf Denial of… | O3 Security