GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4
GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 is a security vulnerability in grumpydictator/firefly-iii. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Firefly III user API endpoints expose all users' information to any authenticated user (IDOR)
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
The User management API endpoints (GET /api/v1/users and GET /api/v1/users/{id}) are accessible to any authenticated user without admin/owner role verification, exposing all users' email addresses, roles, and account status.
Affected Endpoints
- GET /api/v1/users (UserController::index, line 94) — Lists ALL users with full details. No role check.
- GET /api/v1/users/{id} (UserController::show, line 126) — Shows any user's details by ID. No role check.
Root Cause (1-of-N Inconsistency)
Other methods in the same controller properly check for the 'owner' role:
store()—UserStoreRequest::authorize()checksauth()->user()->hasRole('owner')✓destroy()— Explicitly checks$this->repository->hasRole($admin, 'owner')✓
But index() and show() have no role check at all. The route group at routes/api.php:734-747 has no admin middleware, only the global auth:api middleware.
Exposed Data
The UserTransformer (line 40-54) returns:
email— user's email addressrole— user's role (owner/demo)blocked— account blocked statusblocked_code— block reasoncreated_at/updated_at— timestamps
Impact
Any authenticated user can:
- Enumerate ALL user accounts in the instance
- Harvest email addresses for phishing/social engineering
- Identify admin/owner accounts by role
- Determine which accounts are blocked
Exploitation
# List all users
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <any_user_token>" https://instance/api/v1/users
# View specific user details
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <any_user_token>" https://instance/api/v1/users/1
Suggested Fix
Add owner role checks to index() and show(), or restrict the route group with admin middleware:
// Option 1: Add check in controller methods
public function show(User $user): JsonResponse
{
if (!$this->repository->hasRole(auth()->user(), 'owner') && auth()->user()->id !== $user->id) {
throw new FireflyException('200025: No access to function.');
}
// ...
}
// Option 2: Add middleware to route group
Route::group(['middleware' => ['admin'], ...], ...)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | grumpydictator/firefly-iii | ≥ 6.4.23&&< 6.5.1 | 6.5.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for grumpydictator/firefly-iii. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update grumpydictator/firefly-iii to 6.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.