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GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 grumpydictator/firefly-iii

GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 is a security vulnerability in grumpydictator/firefly-iii. A fix is available for grumpydictator/firefly-iii — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Firefly III user API endpoints expose all users' information to any authenticated user (IDOR)

Published
Mar 7, 2026
Updated
Mar 7, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Mar 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘grumpydictator/firefly-iii

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The User management API endpoints (GET /api/v1/users and GET /api/v1/users/{id}) are accessible to any authenticated user without admin/owner role verification, exposing all users' email addresses, roles, and account status.

Affected Endpoints

  1. GET /api/v1/users (UserController::index, line 94) — Lists ALL users with full details. No role check.
  2. GET /api/v1/users/{id} (UserController::show, line 126) — Shows any user's details by ID. No role check.

Root Cause (1-of-N Inconsistency)

Other methods in the same controller properly check for the 'owner' role:

  • store()UserStoreRequest::authorize() checks auth()->user()->hasRole('owner')
  • destroy() — Explicitly checks $this->repository->hasRole($admin, 'owner')

But index() and show() have no role check at all. The route group at routes/api.php:734-747 has no admin middleware, only the global auth:api middleware.

Exposed Data

The UserTransformer (line 40-54) returns:

  • email — user's email address
  • role — user's role (owner/demo)
  • blocked — account blocked status
  • blocked_code — block reason
  • created_at / updated_at — timestamps

Impact

Any authenticated user can:

  1. Enumerate ALL user accounts in the instance
  2. Harvest email addresses for phishing/social engineering
  3. Identify admin/owner accounts by role
  4. Determine which accounts are blocked

Exploitation

# List all users
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <any_user_token>" https://instance/api/v1/users

# View specific user details
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <any_user_token>" https://instance/api/v1/users/1

Suggested Fix

Add owner role checks to index() and show(), or restrict the route group with admin middleware:

// Option 1: Add check in controller methods
public function show(User $user): JsonResponse
{
    if (!$this->repository->hasRole(auth()->user(), 'owner') && auth()->user()->id !== $user->id) {
        throw new FireflyException('200025: No access to function.');
    }
    // ...
}

// Option 2: Add middleware to route group
Route::group(['middleware' => ['admin'], ...], ...)

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistgrumpydictator/firefly-iii6.4.23&&< 6.5.16.5.1composer require grumpydictator/firefly-iii:^6.5.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for grumpydictator/firefly-iii, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update grumpydictator/firefly-iii to 6.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The User management API endpoints (`GET /api/v1/users` and `GET /api/v1/users/{id}`) are accessible to any authenticated user without admin/owner role verification, exposing all users' email addresses, roles, and account status. ### Affected Endpoints 1. **GET /api/v1/users** (UserController::index, line 94) — Lists ALL users with full details. No role check. 2. **GET /api/v1/users/{id}** (UserController::show, line 126) — Shows any user's details by ID. No role check. ### Root Cause (1-of-N Inconsistency) Other methods in the same controller properly check for the 'owner' rol
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-5q8v-j673-m5v4: grumpydictator/firefly | O3 Security