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GHSA-5jfw-35xp-5m42

HIGH

Buffer length underflow in LoginPacket causing unchecked exceptions to be thrown

Published
Apr 5, 2022
Updated
Dec 5, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘pocketmine/bedrock-protocol

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

LoginPacket uses BinaryStream->getLInt() to read the lengths of JSON payloads it wants to decode. Unfortunately, BinaryStream->getLInt() returns a signed integer, meaning that a malicious client can craft a packet with a large uint32 value for payload buffer size (which would be interpreted as a negative signed int32), causing BinaryStream->get() to throw an exception.

In the context of PocketMine-MP, this leads to a server crash when the vulnerability is exploited.

Patches

e3fce7632b94e83fd6a518a87dcaf6a11681c4ac

Workarounds

This can be worked around by registering a custom LoginPacket implementation into PacketPool which overrides this code to patch it.

For more information

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistpocketmine/bedrock-protocolall versions8.0.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pocketmine/bedrock-protocol. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update pocketmine/bedrock-protocol to 8.0.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5jfw-35xp-5m42 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5jfw-35xp-5m42 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-5jfw-35xp-5m42. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact `LoginPacket` uses `BinaryStream->getLInt()` to read the lengths of JSON payloads it wants to decode. Unfortunately, `BinaryStream->getLInt()` returns a signed integer, meaning that a malicious client can craft a packet with a large uint32 value for payload buffer size (which would be interpreted as a negative signed int32), causing `BinaryStream->get()` to throw an exception. In the context of PocketMine-MP, this leads to a server crash when the vulnerability is exploited. ### Patches e3fce7632b94e83fd6a518a87dcaf6a11681c4ac ### Workarounds This can be worked around by registeri
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-5jfw-35xp-5m42 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-5jfw-35xp-5m42 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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