turso-cli persists Turso platform JWT with world-readable (0o644) file permissionsGHSA-57f6-pvx8-hwj6
MEDIUMGHSA-57f6-pvx8-hwj6 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.5) Incorrect Default Permissions vulnerability in github.com/tursodatabase/turso-cli. A fix is available for github.com/tursodatabase/turso-cli — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-57f6-pvx8-hwj6.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-57f6-pvx8-hwj6 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 395,249 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/tursodatabase/turso-cliReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
turso-cli persists the user's Turso platform JWT to settings.json using Viper's default configPermissions of 0o644, leaving the credential file world-readable on standard Linux and macOS systems. Any other local UID on the host can read the file and recover the platform JWT, which grants full Turso platform access scoped to the user's organizations.
Impact
The token in settings.json grants the holder full Turso platform access — create or destroy databases, rotate credentials, exfiltrate data, change billing settings — for any organization the user belongs to.
Because the file is world-readable, the credential is reachable by:
- Cron jobs or daemons running as a different system user on the same host
- Sandboxed CI runners with a mounted home directory
- Containers with a bind-mounted host home
- Co-tenants on a shared multi-user developer or jumpbox host
The file path resolves through configdir.LocalConfig("turso"):
- macOS:
~/Library/Application Support/turso/settings.json - Linux:
~/.config/turso/settings.json(or$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/turso/settings.json)
It contains the platform JWT in plaintext JSON alongside organization and username fields.
Comparable CLIs (gh, aws, docker, gcloud, plus close peers planetscale, neon, upstash) write credential files at 0o600 explicitly, so this is a deviation from the cross-vendor baseline rather than a deliberate trade-off.
Details
The OAuth callback handler stores the platform JWT via the settings layer:
// internal/cmd/auth.go:205-214
jwt, err := callbackServer.Result()
...
settings.SetToken(jwt)
SetToken writes through Viper:
// internal/settings/settings.go:124-127
func (s *Settings) SetToken(token string) {
viper.Set("token", token)
s.changed = true
}
Persistence runs through viper.WriteConfig:
// internal/settings/settings.go:96-101
func TryToPersistChanges() error {
if err := viper.WriteConfig(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to persist turso settings file: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
Viper v1.21.0 (pinned in turso-cli go.mod) initializes configPermissions to os.FileMode(0o644) at viper.go:198 and passes that mode straight to os.OpenFile at viper.go:1688. Without a call to viper.SetConfigPermissions(0o600), the resulting settings.json is created at 0o644.
A grep over the auth-config write path under internal/ returns zero hits for Chmod, 0o600, or 0600, confirming there is no follow-up tightening of the file mode anywhere on the persistence path.
Proof of concept
Minimal reproducer using the same Viper version turso-cli pins (github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0):
package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
)
func main() {
dir, _ := os.MkdirTemp("", "viperpoc-*")
defer os.RemoveAll(dir)
viper.SetConfigName("settings")
viper.SetConfigType("json")
viper.AddConfigPath(dir)
viper.Set("token", "FAKE_TURSO_JWT_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx")
viper.Set("organization", "exampleorg")
viper.SafeWriteConfig()
st, _ := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "settings.json"))
fmt.Printf("mode: %o\n", st.Mode()&0o777)
}
$ go run main.go mode: 644
The same SafeWriteConfig / WriteConfig calls turso-cli uses produce the same 0o644 mode in a real turso auth login flow.
Remediation
One-line fix at the existing Viper configuration site in internal/settings/settings.go (around lines 48-50):
viper.SetConfigName("settings")
viper.SetConfigType("json")
viper.AddConfigPath(configPath)
viper.SetConfigPermissions(0o600) // restrict settings.json to owner only
Defense in depth:
- Add
os.Chmod(configFile, 0o600)afterTryToPersistChanges, or on read (as PlanetScale does ininternal/config/config.go— theyStatthe token file and self-heal ifMode() &^ 0o600is nonzero).viper.SetConfigPermissionsapplies only on file creation, so an existing wider-mode file is not tightened otherwise. - Add
os.Chmod(configPath, 0o700)afterconfigdir.MakePath(configPath)(line 43) to close the equivalent gap on the enclosing directory, which is otherwise created under the default umask.
Patch: https://github.com/tursodatabase/turso-cli/commit/ffb914849216ef5a86353b3fa6cee66f33af3b66
Workarounds
Until upgraded, users can tighten the existing files manually:
# Linux
chmod 600 ~/.config/turso/settings.json
chmod 700 ~/.config/turso
# macOS
chmod 600 "$HOME/Library/Application Support/turso/settings.json"
chmod 700 "$HOME/Library/Application Support/turso"
This must be repeated after any operation that recreates the file (e.g.
turso auth login) until the patched version is installed.
Resources
- Patch commit: https://github.com/tursodatabase/turso-cli/commit/ffb914849216ef5a86353b3fa6cee66f33af3b66
- Viper
configPermissionsdefault: https://github.com/spf13/viper/blob/v1.21.0/viper.go#L198 - Viper write path: https://github.com/spf13/viper/blob/v1.21.0/viper.go#L1688
- CWE-276: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/276.html
- CWE-732: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/732.html
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/tursodatabase/turso-cli | all versions | 1.0.26go get github.com/tursodatabase/turso-cli@v1.0.26 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/tursodatabase/turso-cli, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/tursodatabase/turso-cli to 1.0.26 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-57f6-pvx8-hwj6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-57f6-pvx8-hwj6 in your dependencies?
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