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PHP JWT Library: RSA1_5 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) decryption lacks implicit rejection, exposing a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracleGHSA-5739-39v2-5754

GHSA-5739-39v2-5754 is a security vulnerability in web-token/jwt-library. A fix is available for web-token/jwt-library — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 31, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected
🐘web-token/jwt-library🐘web-token/jwt-library🐘web-token/jwt-library

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15() (used by the RSA1_5 key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing InvalidArgumentException as soon as the padding is malformed. It does not implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).

From a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted encrypted_key values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though JWEDecrypter returns the same false in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.

Affected configurations

Applications that register RSA1_5 in their decryption AlgorithmManager and hold an RSA private key.

Patches

PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rejection: on invalid padding (or unexpected recovered length) it returns a random CEK of the expected size selected in constant time, so the full content-decryption (AEAD) step always runs and fails uniformly, removing the observable difference between padding-valid and padding-invalid ciphertexts. Users are still strongly encouraged to migrate to RSA-OAEP.

Workarounds

Prefer RSA-OAEP/RSA-OAEP-256; do not enable RSA1_5 for untrusted tokens.

References

  • RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2
  • Bleichenbacher (1998); Marvin attack
  • CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy

Résolution

Un correctif a été préparé sur une branche dédiée basée sur 3.4.x, avec des tests anti-régression dédiés (fork privé temporaire de cette advisory, PR #1).

RSA1_5 — déchiffrement PKCS#1 v1.5 avec implicit rejection en temps constant (RFC 3447 §7.2.2) : un padding invalide n'est plus distinguable d'un padding valide, neutralisant l'oracle Bleichenbacher.

Validation : php -l OK, PHPUnit vert, aucune nouvelle erreur PHPStan introduite (différentiel nul vs 3.4.x), aucun commentaire ajouté dans le code source. Après merge, cascade prévue 3.4.x → 4.0.x → 4.1.x.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistweb-token/jwt-libraryall versions3.4.10composer require web-token/jwt-library:^3.4.10
🐘Packagistweb-token/jwt-library≥ 4.0.0&&< 4.0.74.0.7composer require web-token/jwt-library:^4.0.7
🐘Packagistweb-token/jwt-library≥ 4.1.0&&< 4.1.74.1.7composer require web-token/jwt-library:^4.1.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for web-token/jwt-library, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update web-token/jwt-library to 3.4.10 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5739-39v2-5754 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact `RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly). From a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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