Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦 npm

GHSA-553v-f69r-656j

OpenClaw unpaired device identity can bypass operator pairing and self-assign operator scopes with shared auth

Also known asCVE-2026-32042
Published
Mar 3, 2026
Updated
Apr 2, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk35th percentile+0.29%
0.00%0.31%0.63%0.94%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.4%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

openclawnpm
4.3Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

A client using shared gateway auth could attach an unpaired device identity and request elevated operator scopes (including operator.admin) before pairing approval, enabling privilege escalation.

Impact

Attackers with valid shared gateway auth could self-assign higher operator scopes by presenting a self-signed, unpaired device identity.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: >= 2026.2.22 <= 2026.2.24
  • Latest published npm at triage time: 2026.2.24
  • Planned patched release: 2026.2.25

Remediation

Require pairing for operator device-identity sessions authenticated with shared token/password auth (except existing control-ui trusted-proxy/control-ui bypass policy paths).

Fix Commit(s)

  • 8d1481cb4a9d31bd617e52dc8c392c35689d9dea

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the release (>= 2026.2.25). Advisory published with npm release 2026.2.25.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenclaw2026.2.22&&< 2026.2.252026.2.25

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openclaw to 2026.2.25 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-553v-f69r-656j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-553v-f69r-656j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-553v-f69r-656j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A client using shared gateway auth could attach an unpaired device identity and request elevated operator scopes (including `operator.admin`) before pairing approval, enabling privilege escalation. ### Impact Attackers with valid shared gateway auth could self-assign higher operator scopes by presenting a self-signed, unpaired device identity. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `>= 2026.2.22 <= 2026.2.24` - Latest published npm at triage time: `2026.2.24` - Planned patched release: `2026.2.25` ### Remediation Require pairing for operator dev
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-553v-f69r-656j in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-553v-f69r-656j across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.