How severe is GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j?

GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j has a CVSS score of 8.8/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j?

GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j affects the following packages: salvo (crates.io). Ecosystems affected: crates.io.

How do I fix GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j?

Update salvo to 0.88.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j in my crates.io dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for salvo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j?

GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 21th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j?

GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j is classified as Cross-site Scripting (XSS) (CWE-79). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j was published on January 8, 2026 and was last updated on February 3, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🦀 crates.io

GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j

HIGH

Salvo is vulnerable to stored XSS in the list_html function by uploading files with malicious names

Also known asCVE-2026-22257

Published

Jan 8, 2026

Updated

Feb 3, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk21th percentile+0.27%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🦀salvo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The function list_html generates a file view of a folder without sanitizing the files or folders names, potentially leading to XSS in cases where a website allows access to public files using this feature, allowing anyone to upload a file.

Details

The vulnerable snippet of code is the following: dir.rs

// ... fn list_html(...
        let mut link = "".to_owned();
        format!(
            r#"<a href="/">{}</a>{}"#,
            HOME_ICON,
            segments
                .map(|seg| {
                    link = format!("{link}/{seg}");
                    format!("/<a href=\"{link}\">{seg}</a>")
                })
                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
                .join("")
        )
// ...

PoC

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1e161e17-f033-4cc4-855b-43fd38ed1be4

Here is the example app we used:

mian.rs

use salvo::prelude::*;
use salvo::serve_static::StaticDir;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use tokio::fs;

const INDEX_HTML: &str = r#"<!doctype html>
<html>
  <head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>StaticDir PoC</title></head>
  <body>
    <h2>Upload a file</h2>
    <form action="/upload" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">
      <input type="file" name="file" />
      <button type="submit">Upload</button>
    </form>

    <p>Browse uploads:</p>
    <ul>
      <li><a href="/files">/files</a></li>
      <li><a href="/files/">/files/</a></li>
    </ul>
  </body>
</html>
"#;

#[handler]
async fn index(res: &mut Response) {
    res.render(Text::Html(INDEX_HTML));
}

#[handler]
async fn upload(req: &mut Request, res: &mut Response) {
    fs::create_dir_all("uploads").await.expect("create uploads dir");

    let form = match req.form_data().await {
        Ok(v) => v,
        Err(e) => {
            res.status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
            res.render(Text::Plain(format!("form_data parse failed: {e}")));
            return;
        }
    };

    let Some(file_part) = form.files.get("file") else {
        res.status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
        res.render(Text::Plain("missing file field (name=\"file\")"));
        return;
    };

    let original_name = file_part.name().unwrap_or("upload.bin");

    let mut dest = PathBuf::from("uploads");
    dest.push(original_name);

    let tmp_path = file_part.path();
    if let Err(e) = fs::copy(tmp_path, &dest).await {
        res.status_code(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
        res.render(Text::Plain(format!("save failed: {e}")));
        return;
    }

    res.render(Text::Plain(format!(
        "Uploaded as: {original_name}\nNow open: http://127.0.0.1:5800/files/\n"
    )));
}

#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
    tracing_subscriber::fmt().init();
    fs::create_dir_all("uploads").await.expect("create uploads dir");

    let router = Router::new()
        .get(index)
        .push(Router::with_path("upload").post(upload))
        .push(
            Router::with_path("files/{**rest_path}")
                .get(StaticDir::new("uploads").auto_list(true)),
        );

    let acceptor = TcpListener::new("127.0.0.1:5800").bind().await;
    Server::new(acceptor).serve(router).await;
}

Cargo.toml

[package]
name = "poc"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"

[dependencies]
salvo = { version = "0.85.0", features = ["serve-static"] }
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "rt-multi-thread", "fs"] }
tracing-subscriber = "0.3"

Impact

JavaScript execution, most likely leading to an account takeover, depending on the site's constraint (CSP, etc…).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🦀crates.io	`salvo`	all versions	0.88.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for salvo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update salvo to 0.88.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Summary The function `list_html` generates a file view of a folder without sanitizing the files or folders names, potentially leading to XSS in cases where a website allows access to public files using this feature, allowing anyone to upload a file. # Details The vulnerable snippet of code is the following: [**dir.rs**](https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/blob/16efeba312a274739606ce76366d921768628654/crates/serve-static/src/dir.rs#L581) ```rust // ... fn list_html(... let mut link = "".to_owned(); format!( r#"<a href="/">{}</a>{}"#, HOME_ICON,

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-54m3-5fxr-2f3j in your dependencies?

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