Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦 npm

GHSA-5339-hvwr-7582

NONE

Unhead Vulnerable to Bypass of URI Scheme Sanitization in makeTagSafe via Case-Sensitivity

Also known asCVE-2026-31873
Published
Mar 12, 2026
Updated
Mar 14, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk14th percentile+0.22%
0.00%0.25%0.49%0.74%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.2%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

unheadnpm
2.8Mdownloads / week

Description

The link.href check in makeTagSafe (safe.ts, line 68-71) uses String.includes(), which is case-sensitive:

if (key === 'href') {
  if (val.includes('javascript:') || val.includes('data:')) {
    return
  }
  next[key] = val
}

Browsers treat URI schemes case-insensitively. DATA:text/css,... is the same as data:text/css,... to the browser, but 'DATA:...'.includes('data:') returns false.

PoC

useHeadSafe({
  link: [{
    rel: 'stylesheet',
    href: 'DATA:text/css,body{display:none}'
  }]
})

SSR output:

<link rel="stylesheet" href="DATA:text/css,body{display:none}">

The browser loads this as a CSS stylesheet. An attacker can inject arbitrary CSS for UI redressing or data exfiltration via CSS attribute selectors with background-image callbacks.

Any case variation works: DATA:, Data:, dAtA:, JAVASCRIPT:, etc.

Suggested fix

if (key === 'href') {
  const lower = val.toLowerCase()
  if (lower.includes('javascript:') || lower.includes('data:')) {
    return
  }
  next[key] = val
}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmunheadall versions2.1.11

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for unhead. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update unhead to 2.1.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5339-hvwr-7582 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5339-hvwr-7582 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-5339-hvwr-7582. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

The `link.href` check in `makeTagSafe` (safe.ts, line 68-71) uses `String.includes()`, which is case-sensitive: ```typescript if (key === 'href') { if (val.includes('javascript:') || val.includes('data:')) { return } next[key] = val } ``` Browsers treat URI schemes case-insensitively. `DATA:text/css,...` is the same as `data:text/css,...` to the browser, but `'DATA:...'.includes('data:')` returns `false`. ### PoC ```javascript useHeadSafe({ link: [{ rel: 'stylesheet', href: 'DATA:text/css,body{display:none}' }] }) ``` SSR output: ```html <link rel="stylesheet" href=
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-5339-hvwr-7582 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-5339-hvwr-7582 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.