SillyTavern: Path Traversal allows file existence oracleGHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp
MEDIUMGHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Path Traversal vulnerability in sillytavern. A fix is available for sillytavern — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
sillytavernnpmDescription
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in the static file route handler allows any unauthenticated user to determine whether files exist anywhere on the server's filesystem. By sending percent-encoded ../ sequences (%2E%2E%2F) in requests to static file routes, an attacker can check for the existence of files (404 if it doesn't exist, 403 means it exists).
Details
The vulnerability is in createRouteHandler (src/users.js:947–963), which backs all user-data static file routes:
function createRouteHandler(directoryFn) {
return async (req, res) => {
const directory = directoryFn(req);
const filePath = decodeURIComponent(req.params[0]);
const exists = fs.existsSync(path.join(directory, filePath)); // no boundary check here
if (!exists) {
return res.sendStatus(404);
}
return res.sendFile(filePath, { root: directory });
};
}
req.params[0] contains the raw (percent-encoded) wildcard from the URL. After decodeURIComponent, a request path like /characters/%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2FUsers/kirakira decodes to ../../Users/kirakira, and path.join resolves it outside the intended directory. res.sendFile correctly blocks the file from being served (the send module's root check returns 403), but fs.existsSync had already run, and the 403/404 distinction reveals the result.
Affected routes (they all use the same handler, so they're all affected):
/characters/*/user/files/*/assets/*/user/images/*/backgrounds/*/User%20Avatars/*
PoC
curl -o /dev/null -s -w "%{http_code}\n" "http://localhost:8000/characters/%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2FUsers/kirakira/something"
Impact
While file contents cannot be read (the send module blocks actual delivery), anyone who can reach the SillyTavern HTTP port can check the existence of files on the host filesystem.
Resolution
The issue was addressed in version 1.17.0.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | sillytavern | all versions | 1.17.0npm install sillytavern@1.17.0 |
Affected Products
sillytavernsillytavernDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sillytavern, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update sillytavern to 1.17.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.