GHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp
MEDIUMGHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Path Traversal vulnerability in sillytavern. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
SillyTavern: Path Traversal allows file existence oracle
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, a proxy for how much of the ecosystem is exposed.
sillytavernnpmDescription
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in the static file route handler allows any unauthenticated user to determine whether files exist anywhere on the server's filesystem. By sending percent-encoded ../ sequences (%2E%2E%2F) in requests to static file routes, an attacker can check for the existence of files (404 if it doesn't exist, 403 means it exists).
Details
The vulnerability is in createRouteHandler (src/users.js:947–963), which backs all user-data static file routes:
function createRouteHandler(directoryFn) {
return async (req, res) => {
const directory = directoryFn(req);
const filePath = decodeURIComponent(req.params[0]);
const exists = fs.existsSync(path.join(directory, filePath)); // no boundary check here
if (!exists) {
return res.sendStatus(404);
}
return res.sendFile(filePath, { root: directory });
};
}
req.params[0] contains the raw (percent-encoded) wildcard from the URL. After decodeURIComponent, a request path like /characters/%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2FUsers/kirakira decodes to ../../Users/kirakira, and path.join resolves it outside the intended directory. res.sendFile correctly blocks the file from being served (the send module's root check returns 403), but fs.existsSync had already run, and the 403/404 distinction reveals the result.
Affected routes (they all use the same handler, so they're all affected):
/characters/*/user/files/*/assets/*/user/images/*/backgrounds/*/User%20Avatars/*
PoC
curl -o /dev/null -s -w "%{http_code}\n" "http://localhost:8000/characters/%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2FUsers/kirakira/something"
Impact
While file contents cannot be read (the send module blocks actual delivery), anyone who can reach the SillyTavern HTTP port can check the existence of files on the host filesystem.
Resolution
The issue was addressed in version 1.17.0.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | sillytavern | all versions | 1.17.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sillytavern. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update sillytavern to 1.17.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-525j-2hrj-m8fp across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.