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GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm

MEDIUM

Mailpit is vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) allowing unauthenticated access to emails

Also known asCVE-2026-22689GO-2026-4310
Published
Jan 13, 2026
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk11th percentile+0.20%
0.00%0.24%0.47%0.71%0.0%0.2%Feb 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/axllent/mailpit🐹github.com/axllent/mailpit

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary The Mailpit WebSocket server is configured to accept connections from any origin. This lack of Origin header validation introduces a Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) vulnerability.

An attacker can host a malicious website that, when visited by a developer running Mailpit locally, establishes a WebSocket connection to the victim's Mailpit instance (default ws://localhost:8025). This allows the attacker to intercept sensitive data such as email contents, headers, and server statistics in real-time.

Vulnerable Code The vulnerability exists in server/websockets/client.go where the CheckOrigin function is explicitly set to return true for all requests, bypassing standard Same-Origin Policy (SOP) protections provided by the gorilla/websocket library.

https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/blob/877a9159ceeaf380d5bb0e1d84017b24d2e7b361/server/websockets/client.go#L34-L39

Impact This vulnerability impacts the Confidentiality of the data stored in or processed by Mailpit. Although Mailpit is often used as a local development tool, this vulnerability allows remote exploitation via a web browser.

  • Scenario: A developer has Mailpit running at localhost:8025.
  • Trigger: The developer visits a malicious website (or a compromised legitimate site) in the same browser.
  • Exploitation: The malicious site's JavaScript initiates a WebSocket connection to ws://localhost:8025/api/events. Since the origin check is disabled, the browser allows this cross-origin connection.
  • Data Leak: The attacker receives all broadcasted events, including full email details (subjects, sender/receiver info) and server metrics.

Attack Impact

  • Real-time notification of new emails
  • Email metadata (sender, subject, recipients)
  • Mailbox statistics
  • All WebSocket broadcast data

Recommended Fix The CheckOrigin function should be removed to allow gorilla/websocket to enforce its default safe behavior (checking that the Origin matches the Host). Alternatively, strict validation logic should be implemented.

Proposed Change (Remove unsafe check):

var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
    ReadBufferSize:    1024,
    WriteBufferSize:   1024,
    // CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }, // REMOVED
    EnableCompression: true,
}

Proof of Concept (PoC): To reproduce this vulnerability:

  • Start Mailpit (default settings).
  • Save the following HTML code as poc.html and serve it from a different origin (e.g., using python http.server on port 8000 or opening it directly as a file).
  • Open the poc_websocket_hijack.html file in your browser.
  • Send a test email to Mailpit or perform any action in the Mailpit UI.
  • Observe that the "malicious" page successfully receives the event data.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/axllent/mailpit1.2.6&&< 1.28.21.28.2
🐹Gogithub.com/axllent/mailpitall versions0.0.0-20260110031614

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/axllent/mailpit. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/axllent/mailpit to 1.28.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

**Summary** The Mailpit WebSocket server is configured to accept connections from any origin. This lack of Origin header validation introduces a Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) vulnerability. An attacker can host a malicious website that, when visited by a developer running Mailpit locally, establishes a WebSocket connection to the victim's Mailpit instance (default ws://localhost:8025). This allows the attacker to intercept sensitive data such as email contents, headers, and server statistics in real-time. **Vulnerable Code** The vulnerability exists in server/websockets/client.go wh
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.