NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🦀
🦀 crates.io
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

eyre: Parts of Report are dropped as the wrong type during downcastGHSA-4v52-7q2x-v4xj

HIGHFix: eyre-rs/eyre@770ac3f

GHSA-4v52-7q2x-v4xj is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) remote code execution vulnerability in eyre. A fix is available for eyre — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asRUSTSEC-2024-0021
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀eyre

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

In affected versions, after a Report is constructed using wrap_err or wrap_err_with to attach a message of type D onto an error of type E, then using downcast to recover ownership of either the value of type D or the value of type E, one of two things can go wrong:

  • If downcasting to E, there remains a value of type D to be dropped. It is incorrectly "dropped" by running E's drop behavior, rather than D's. For example if D is &str and E is std::io::Error, there would be a call of std::io::Error::drop in which the reference received by the Drop impl does not refer to a valid value of type std::io::Error, but instead to &str.

  • If downcasting to D, there remains a value of type E to be dropped. When D and E do not happen to be the same size, E's drop behavior is incorrectly executed in the wrong location. The reference received by the Drop impl may point left or right of the real E value that is meant to be getting dropped.

In both cases, when the Report contains an error E that has nontrivial drop behavior, the most likely outcome is memory corruption.

When the Report contains an error E that has trivial drop behavior (for example a Utf8Error) but where D has nontrivial drop behavior (such as String), the most likely outcome is that downcasting to E would leak D.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.ioeyre≥ 0.6.9&&< 0.6.120.6.12cargo update -p eyre --precise 0.6.12

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for eyre, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update eyre to 0.6.12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4v52-7q2x-v4xj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Constrain what reaches the vulnerable code: limit the size and shape of untrusted input, isolate the affected component in a sandboxed or least-privileged process, and enable the platform's memory-safety mitigations (ASLR, stack protector, hardened allocator) so an out-of-bounds access is more likely to fail closed than to be exploitable.

Frequently Asked Questions

In affected versions, after a `Report` is constructed using `wrap_err` or `wrap_err_with` to attach a message of type `D` onto an error of type `E`, then using `downcast` to recover ownership of either the value of type `D` or the value of type `E`, one of two things can go wrong: - If downcasting to `E`, there remains a value of type `D` to be dropped. It is incorrectly "dropped" by running `E`'s drop behavior, rather than `D`'s. For example if `D` is `&str` and `E` is `std::io::Error`, there would be a call of `std::io::Error::drop` in which the reference received by the `Drop` impl does no
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-4v52-7q2x-v4xj in your dependencies?

Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works
eyre: Parts of Report are dropped as the wrong type…