GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.4) CWE-303 vulnerability in openclaw. A fix is available for openclaw — see the affected versions and patch details below.
OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,238 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
openclawnpmDescription
Summary
An authentication bypass in the optional voice-call extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to allowlist or pairing.
Deployments that do not install/enable the voice-call extension are not affected.
Affected Packages / Versions
openclaw(npm):<= 2026.2.1- Fixed in:
>= 2026.2.2
Details
In affected versions (for example 2026.2.1), the inbound allowlist check in extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.
This allowed two bypasses:
- Missing/empty
fromvalues normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed. - Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.
Proof Of Concept
- Configure the voice-call extension with
inboundPolicy: allowlistandallowFrom: ["+15550001234"]. - Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.
- Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with
15550001234(for example+99915550001234). The call is accepted.
Impact
Only operators who install/enable the optional voice-call extension and use inboundPolicy=allowlist or pairing could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.
Fix
The fix hardens inbound policy handling:
- Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.
- Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).
- Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.
Fix commit(s):
f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb
Thanks @simecek for reporting.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | openclaw | all versions | 2026.2.2npm install openclaw@2026.2.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update openclaw to 2026.2.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.