GHSA-4jhj-3gv3-c3gr
HIGHCLI for Vela Insecure Variable Substitution
Blast Radius
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Description
Impact
Vela pipelines can use variable substitution combined with insensitive fields like parameters, image and entrypoint to inject secrets into a plugin/image and — by using common substitution string manipulation — can bypass log masking and expose secrets without the use of the commands block. This unexpected behavior primarily impacts secrets restricted by the "no commands" option. This can lead to unintended use of the secret value, and increased risk of exposing the secret during image execution bypassing log masking.
Given by the following substitution examples:
using parameters
steps:
- name: example
image: <some plugin>
secrets: [ example_secret ]
parameters:
example: $${EXAMPLE_SECRET}
using image tag
steps:
- name: example
image: <some plugin>:latest${EXAMPLE_SECRET}
secrets: [ example_secret ]
using entrypoint as a shim for commands
steps:
- name: example
image: <some plugin>
secrets: [ example_secret ]
entrypoint:
[
"sh",
"-c",
"echo $EXAMPLE_SECRET",
]
To exploit this the pipeline author must be supplying the secrets to a plugin that is designed in such a way that will print those parameters in logs. Plugin parameters are not designed for sensitive values and are often intentionally printed throughout execution for informational/debugging purposes. Parameters should therefore be treated as insensitive.
While Vela provides secrets masking, secrets exposure is not entirely solved by the masking process. A docker image (plugin) can easily expose secrets if they are not handled properly, or altered in some way. There is a responsibility on the end-user to understand how values injected into a plugin are used. This is a risk that exists for many CICD systems (like GitHub Actions) that handle sensitive runtime variables. Rather, the greater risk is that users who restrict a secret to the "no commands" option and use image restriction can still have their secret value exposed via substitution tinkering, which turns the image and command restrictions into a false sense of security.
Patches
N/A
Workarounds
- Do not provide sensitive values to plugins that can potentially expose them, especially in
parametersthat are not intended to be used for sensitive values. - Ensure plugins (especially those that utilize shared secrets) follow best practices to avoid logging parameters that are expected to be sensitive.
- Minimize secrets with
pull_requestevents enabled, as this allows users to change pipeline configurations and pull in secrets to steps not typically part of the CI process. - Make use of the build approval setting, restricting builds from untrusted users
- Limit use of shared secrets, as they are less restrictive to access by nature.
References
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Email us at [email protected]
Affected products: go-vela/worker
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/go-vela/cli | all versions | 0.23.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/go-vela/cli. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/go-vela/cli to 0.23.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4jhj-3gv3-c3gr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-4jhj-3gv3-c3gr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-4jhj-3gv3-c3gr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-4jhj-3gv3-c3gr in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-4jhj-3gv3-c3gr across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.