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HIGH severity

Podman: Malformed Image can trick podman run into leaking host environment variables into the containerGHSA-4hq8-gpf5-8p68

HIGHFix: podman-container-tools/podman@6c431b7

GHSA-4hq8-gpf5-8p68 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Information Exposure vulnerability in github.com/containers/podman/v5. A fix is available for github.com/containers/podman/v5 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-57231GO-2026-6594
Published
Updated
Affected
6 pkgs
Patched
2 / 6
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-4hq8-gpf5-8p68.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs37th percentile — riskier than 37% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.31%0.62%0.94%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.4%Jul 26Sep 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-4hq8-gpf5-8p68 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

6 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/containers/podman/v5🐹go.podman.io/podman/v6🐹github.com/containers/podman/v4🐹github.com/containers/podman/v3🐹github.com/containers/podman/v2🐹github.com/containers/podman

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An container image that contains a environment variable with just a key and no value can trick podman into passing that variable from the host into the container. This is made worse by the fact that using an asterisk (*) will cause podman to pass all host variables into the container. So essentially a malicious image can exfiltrate all podman environment variables that are set in the session from where the container is launched.

Details

podman run allows --env VAR1 or --env VAR* which will read the variable values from the current environment and then passes them into the container. However because the same parsing logic was reused for the image config env section that means that an image variable could also gain access to that.

Patch

That image spec requires the env variables to be in the form of key=value, so to address this invalid formatted variables get rejected and the container will not run.

Fixed in https://github.com/podman-container-tools/podman/commit/6c431b73dbf8e4b20b778644d7a80caebdb75050

Workaround

Do not run untrusted images. Before running an image consider inspecting the config with podman image inspect --format '{{.Config.Env}}' <image> and check for any variables that do not have a value assigned.

Affected Packages

6 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/containers/podman/v5all versions5.8.4go get github.com/containers/podman/v5@v5.8.4
🐹Gogo.podman.io/podman/v6all versions6.0.0go get go.podman.io/podman/v6@v6.0.0
🐹Gogithub.com/containers/podman/v4all versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/containers/podman/v3all versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/containers/podman/v2all versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/containers/podman≥ 1.8.1No fix

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
podmanpodman_project
≥ 1.8.1 && < 5.8.4
1 version
6.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/containers/podman/v5, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/containers/podman/v5 to 5.8.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4hq8-gpf5-8p68 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant
Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-4hq8-gpf5-8p68 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10podman-7:5.8.2-4.el10_2RHSA-2026:37072
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8container-tools:rhel8-8100020260709093628.afee755dRHSA-2026:38504
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9podman-6:5.8.2-4.el9_8RHSA-2026:37123
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9:4.22.9.8.202607220526-0RHSA-2026:44232
Red Hat Hardened Imagespodman-main-6.0.0-1.hum1RHSA-2026:29954
Red Hat Quay 3.10quay/quay-rhel8:1786395065RHSA-2026:53520
Red Hat Quay 3.12quay/quay-rhel8:1786170635RHSA-2026:52968
Red Hat Quay 3.14quay/quay-rhel8:1788593843RHSA-2026:70267

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary An container image that contains a environment variable with just a key and no value can trick podman into passing that variable from the host into the container. This is made worse by the fact that using an asterisk (*) will cause podman to pass all host variables into the container. So essentially a malicious image can exfiltrate all podman environment variables that are set in the session from where the container is launched. ## Details podman run allows `--env VAR1` or `--env VAR*` which will read the variable values from the current environment and then passes them into the
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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