Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
💎
💎 RubyGems
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

omniauth-apple allows attacker to fake their email address during authenticationGHSA-49r3-2549-3633

HIGHFix: nhosoya/omniauth-apple@b37d540

GHSA-49r3-2549-3633 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.7) CWE-290 vulnerability in omniauth-apple. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for omniauth-apple — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2020-26254
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Oct 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs70th percentile — riskier than 70% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.61%1.23%1.84%0.3%1.3%Apr 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-49r3-2549-3633 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 385,987 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
💎omniauth-apple

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

This vulnerability impacts applications using the omniauth-apple strategy of OmniAuth and using the info.email field of OmniAuth's Auth Hash Schema for any kind of identification. The value of this field may be set to any value of the attacker's choice including email addresses of other users.

For example, an application using omniauth-apple with the following code will be impacted:

def omniauth_callback
    auth_hash = request.env['omniauth.auth']
    @authenticated_user = User.find_by(email: auth_hash.info.email)
end

Applications not using info.email for identification but are instead using the uid field are not impacted in the same manner. Note, these applications may still be negatively affected if the value of info.email is being used for other purposes.

Patches

Applications using affected versions of omniauth-apple are advised to upgrade to omniauth-apple version 1.0.1 or later.

Workarounds

If unable to upgrade to a patched version, monkey patching OmniAuth::Strategies::Apple#email as follows is advised as a workaround:

module OmniAuth
  module Strategies
    class Apple
      def email
        id_info['email']
      end
    end
  end
end

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💎RubyGemsomniauth-appleall versions1.0.1bundle update omniauth-apple --conservative

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
omniauth-appleomniauth-apple_project
< 1.0.1
range
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for omniauth-apple, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update omniauth-apple to 1.0.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-49r3-2549-3633 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact This vulnerability impacts applications using the [omniauth-apple](https://github.com/nhosoya/omniauth-apple) strategy of OmniAuth and using the `info.email` field of OmniAuth's [Auth Hash Schema](https://github.com/omniauth/omniauth/wiki/Auth-Hash-Schema) for any kind of identification. The value of this field may be set to any value of the attacker's choice including email addresses of other users. For example, an application using omniauth-apple with the following code will be impacted: ```ruby def omniauth_callback auth_hash = request.env['omniauth.auth'] @authenticat
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-49r3-2549-3633 in your dependencies?

Find it across RubyGems, including transitive dependencies.

GHSA-49r3-2549-3633: omniauth-apple — Fixed in 1.0.1