GHSA-487p-qx68-5vjw
MEDIUMHail relies on OIDC email claims to verify the validity of a user's domain.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
hailReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
All Hail Batch clusters are affected. An attacker is able to:
- Create one or more accounts with Hail Batch without corresponding real accounts in the organization.
For example, a user could create a Microsoft or Google account and then change their email to "[email protected]". This Microsoft or Google account can then be used to create a Hail Batch account in Hail Batch clusters whose organization domain is "example.org".
In Google, this attack is partially mitigated because Google requires users to verify ownership of their Google account. However, a valid user is able to create multiple distinct Hail Batch accounts by creating multiple distinct Google accounts using email addresses of the form "[email protected]".
In Microsoft, this attack requires Azure AD Administrator access to an Azure AD Tenant. The Azure AD Administrator is permitted to change the email address of an account to any other email address without verification. An attacker can create an Azure Tenant for free.
- The attacker does not have access to any private data (because the new service principals or service accounts are not granted any privileges).
- If trial Hail Batch billing projects are enabled, the attacker does have the ability to run jobs and thus spend money. An attacker can create as many accounts as Microsoft or Google permit.
- The attacker cannot impersonate another user because, in Azure, we use the
subfrom the OAuth2 response, and, in Google, Google does an email verification.
Remediation
- Apply this patch to prevent third-party attackers from creating accounts.
- Audit your users list https://auth.example.org/users for user accounts whose login ids are not valid login ids with your identity provider. Delete such users.
A forthcoming change will prevent users from creating multiple accounts using Google's + email redirection.
Workarounds
None.
References
- https://trufflesecurity.com/blog/google-oauth-is-broken-sort-of/
- https://www.descope.com/blog/post/noauth
- https://developers.google.com/identity/openid-connect/openid-connect#an-id-tokens-payload
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/access-token-claims-reference#payload-claims
[1] Hail Batch must separately stop using emails and start using the OAuth2 sub in Google. This is a known deficiency. In particular, if an email is re-used by the organization for a new user, the new user could access the old user's Hail Batch account.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | hail | all versions | 0.2.127 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hail. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update hail to 0.2.127 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-487p-qx68-5vjw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-487p-qx68-5vjw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-487p-qx68-5vjw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-487p-qx68-5vjw in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-487p-qx68-5vjw across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.