GHSA-47wr-426j-fr82
MEDIUMSymbolic links in an unpacking routine may enable attackers to read and/or write to arbitrary locations in dbdeployer
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/datacharmer/dbdeployerReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
Users unpacking a tarball through dbdeployer may use a maliciously packaged tarball that contains symlinks to files external to the target. In such scenario, an attacker could induce dbdeployer to write into a system file, thus altering the computer defences.
Mitigating factors
For the attach to succeed, the following factors need to contribute:
- The user is logged in as root. While dbdeployer is usable as root, it was designed to run as unprivileged user.
- The user has taken a tarball from a non secure source, without testing the checksum. When the tarball is retrieved through dbdeployer, the checksum is compared before attempting to unpack.
Analysis
An attacker could inject a symbolic link into the tarball, so that a file could result into fake_file -> /etc/passwd or some equally important file.
As it is now, dbdeployer would create the symlink as defined, with a local file fake_file linked to /etc/passwd. The danger here is that any process with the privileges to write to both fake_file and /etc/passwd could overwrite the system file. Even without malicious intent, this could result in the system to become unusable.
As noted above, the user must have write privileges to the target file to do the damage.
Remedies
It has been suggested that the extract procedure use filepath.EvalSymlinks to determine whether the target is within the extraction directory. Unfortunately, this approach is unavailable in this context, because it would prevent legitimate patterns from being carried out.
A simple case is a file mysql-8.0.22-macos10.15-x86_64/bin/libprotobuf-lite.3.11.4.dylib with a linkName ../lib/libprotobuf-lite.3.11.4.dylib, if the linked file has not been created yet, filepath.EvalSymlinks would fail, as it acts on existing files only.
An alternative method is comparing the depth (how many directories) of the file name with the depth of the link name. If the link name has a higher depth than the local file, we block the operation with an appropriate error:
Unpacking tarball exploit/mysql-8.0.22-macos10.15-x86_64.tar.gz to $HOME/opt/mysql/test8.0.22
......
link '../../../../../../../../../../etc' points outside target directory
exit status 1
As an additional fortifier, we can check whether the link points to an existing file, calculate its absolute name, and compare it with the absolute name of the extraction directory. A link to a full path (such as /etc/passwd) would fail this test, and trigger an error.
The same check can be applied to a link to a non existing file with absolute path.
Patches
Patched in release 1.58.2
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open an issue in dbdeployer
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/datacharmer/dbdeployer | all versions | 1.58.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/datacharmer/dbdeployer. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/datacharmer/dbdeployer to 1.58.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-47wr-426j-fr82 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-47wr-426j-fr82 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-47wr-426j-fr82. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-47wr-426j-fr82 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-47wr-426j-fr82 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.