GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) Missing Authentication vulnerability in zeptoclaw. A fix is available for zeptoclaw — see the affected versions and patch details below.
ZeptoClaw: Generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields; allowlist is checked against untrusted payload data
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,333 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
zeptoclawReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields (sender, chat_id) from the request body and applies authorization checks to those untrusted values. Because authentication is optional and defaults to disabled (auth_token: None), an attacker who can reach POST /webhook can spoof an allowlisted sender and choose arbitrary chat_id values, enabling high-risk message spoofing and potential IDOR-style session/chat routing abuse.
Details
Relevant code paths:
src/channels/webhook.rs:121sets runtime defaultauth_token: None.src/config/types.rs:910also defaults webhook configauth_tokentoNone.src/channels/webhook.rs:224(validate_auth) explicitly allows requests when no token is configured.src/channels/webhook.rs:128definesWebhookPayloadwith identity fields fully controlled by caller input:sender: Stringchat_id: String
src/channels/webhook.rs:421performs allowlist authorization usingpayload.sender.src/channels/webhook.rs:433andsrc/channels/webhook.rs:434createInboundMessageusing untrustedpayload.senderandpayload.chat_id.
Why this is vulnerable:
- The system treats user-provided JSON identity as authoritative identity.
- Allowlist enforcement does not verify sender authenticity beyond that payload value.
chat_idis also attacker-controlled, so routing/session association can be steered to arbitrary chats/conversations.- If the webhook is exposed without strong upstream authn/authz controls, spoofing is straightforward.
PoC
- Configure the webhook channel in a vulnerable posture (common default behavior):
enabled = truebind_address = "0.0.0.0"(or any reachable interface)port = 9876path = "/webhook"auth_token = null(or omitted)allow_from = ["trusted-user-1"]deny_by_default = true
- Start ZeptoClaw.
- Send a forged request with attacker-chosen
senderandchat_id, without anyAuthorizationheader:
curl -i -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:9876/webhook" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
"message":"FORGED: run privileged workflow",
"sender":"trusted-user-1",
"chat_id":"victim-chat-42"
}'
- Observe:
- Response is
HTTP/1.1 200 OK. - Message is accepted as if it originated from
trusted-user-1. - Message is routed under attacker-chosen
chat_id(victim-chat-42).
- Response is
Impact
- Vulnerability type:
- Authentication/authorization bypass (identity spoofing)
- IDOR-style routing/control issue via attacker-chosen
chat_id
- Affected deployments:
- Any deployment exposing the generic webhook endpoint without strict upstream authentication and identity binding.
- Security consequences:
- Forged inbound messages from spoofed trusted users.
- Bypass of allowlist intent by injecting allowlisted sender IDs in payload.
- Cross-chat/session contamination or hijacking by choosing arbitrary
chat_id. - Potential unauthorized downstream agent/tool actions triggered by malicious input.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | zeptoclaw | all versions | 0.7.6cargo update -p zeptoclaw --precise 0.7.6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for zeptoclaw, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update zeptoclaw to 0.7.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c across crates.io dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.