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📦 GitHub Actions

GHSA-46g3-37rh-v698

Egress Policy Bypass via DNS over HTTPS (DoH) in Harden-Runner (Community Tier)

Also known asCVE-2026-32947
Published
Mar 17, 2026
Updated
Mar 20, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk22th percentile+0.20%
0.00%0.27%0.54%0.80%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.3%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
📦step-security/harden-runner

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A vulnerability exists in the Community Tier of Harden-Runner that allows bypassing the egress-policy: block network restriction using DNS over HTTPS (DoH).

Harden-Runner secures GitHub Actions workflows on runners by applying network policies, including an allowed-endpoints configuration that limits outbound traffic to specified domains and ports (e.g., github.com:443). In egress-policy: block mode, non-compliant connections are intercepted and denied.

This vulnerability exploits DoH, a protocol that encapsulates DNS queries within HTTPS requests. By crafting a DNS query that embeds exfiltrated data as a subdomain (e.g., encoding the runner's hostname into a label), an attacker can route the request through a permitted HTTPS endpoint like dns.google (8.8.8.8's DoH service). The resolver processes the query and forwards it to the attacker's controlled domain, achieving exfiltration without directly accessing the blocked destination. This evades Harden-Runner's domain-based filtering, as the initial HTTPS connection appears legitimate.

This vulnerability requires the attacker to already have code execution capabilities within the GitHub Actions workflow.

The Enterprise Tier of Harden-Runner is not affected by this vulnerability.

Impact

When Harden-Runner is configured with egress-policy: block and a restrictive allowed-endpoints list, an attacker with existing code execution capabilities within a GitHub Actions workflow can bypass the allowed domains check via DNS over HTTPS by proxying DNS queries through a permitted resolver (e.g., Google's DoH service). This allows data exfiltration even when allowed-endpoints is set to only whitelisted domains.

This vulnerability affects only the Community Tier. It requires the attacker to already have code execution capabilities within the GitHub Actions workflow.

Remediation

For Community Tier Users

Upgrade to Harden-Runner v2.16.0 or later.

For Enterprise Tier Users

No action required. Enterprise tier customers are not affected by this vulnerability.

Credit

We would like to thank Devansh Batham for responsibly disclosing this vulnerability through our security reporting process.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦GitHub Actionsstep-security/harden-runnerall versions2.16.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for step-security/harden-runner. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update step-security/harden-runner to 2.16.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-46g3-37rh-v698 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-46g3-37rh-v698 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-46g3-37rh-v698. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary A vulnerability exists in the Community Tier of Harden-Runner that allows bypassing the `egress-policy: block` network restriction using DNS over HTTPS (DoH). Harden-Runner secures GitHub Actions workflows on runners by applying network policies, including an `allowed-endpoints` configuration that limits outbound traffic to specified domains and ports (e.g., `github.com:443`). In `egress-policy: block` mode, non-compliant connections are intercepted and denied. This vulnerability exploits DoH, a protocol that encapsulates DNS queries within HTTPS requests. By crafting a DNS quer
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-46g3-37rh-v698 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-46g3-37rh-v698 across GitHub Actions dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.