GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.9) CWE-284 vulnerability in github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Sealed Secrets for Kubernetes: Rotate API Allows Scope Widening from Strict/Namespace-Wide to Cluster-Wide via Untrusted Template Annotations
Real-World Exposure
github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secretsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
This report shows a scope-widening issue in the rotate (re-encrypt) flow: the output scope can be derived from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations on the input sealed secret.
If a victim sealed secret is strict- or namespace-scoped, an attacker who can submit it to the rotate endpoint can set sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true in the template metadata and receive a rotated sealed secret that is cluster-wide, enabling retargeting (metadata.name/metadata.namespace) and unsealing to recover the victim plaintext.
Relevant Links (Pinned)
- Rotate handler uses
NewSealedSecret(..., secret)after unsealing: https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/controller/controller.go#L560-L606 - Scope derivation reads secret annotations (
SecretScope): https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go#L112-L122
Root Cause
The rotate flow unseals the input sealed secret to a Secret, then reseals using NewSealedSecret(..., secret).
Because SecretScope(secret) is computed from secret annotations, and unsealing applies spec.template metadata onto the unsealed secret, an attacker can influence the scope of the rotated output by mutating template annotations on the rotate input.
Attack Path
- Attacker obtains a victim
SealedSecretobject (for example via read access to resources or logs) and can submit it to the controller rotate endpoint. - Attacker sets
spec.template.metadata.annotations.sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true(and optionally retargets name/namespace fields). - Rotate returns a resealed, cluster-wide sealed secret that is no longer bound to the victim name/namespace.
- Attacker unseals the rotated output in their chosen namespace/name to recover the victim plaintext.
Proof of Concept
Setup + run:
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make test
Canonical output (excerpt):
[CALLSITE_HIT]: pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go:112 SecretScope
[PROOF_MARKER]: scope_widened=true rotated_scope=cluster-wide
Control output (excerpt):
[NC_MARKER]: scope_widened=false strict_scope_preserved=true
Fix Accepted When
Rotate preserves the original sealing scope and does not allow scope widening based on untrusted template metadata; strict or namespace-wide inputs cannot produce cluster-wide outputs.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets | all versions | 0.36.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets to 0.36.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.