ApostropheCMS: CAPTCHA response token not URL-encodedGHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq
Fix: apostrophecms/apostrophe@9500b8bGHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq is a CWE-116 vulnerability in @apostrophecms/form. A fix is available for @apostrophecms/form — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@apostrophecms/formnpm@apostrophecms/login-recaptchanpm@apostrophecms/login-hcaptchanpmDescription
Summary Form and login CAPTCHA verification interpolate the user-supplied widget token unencoded into the server-side verification URL/body, allowing a crafted token to inject query parameters into the reCAPTCHA/hCaptcha verify request.
Details
packages/form/lib/recaptcha.js:39—recaptchaUri = 'https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api/siteverify?secret=${recaptchaSecret}&response=${input.recaptcha}'packages/login-recaptcha/index.js:44— same pattern for loginpackages/login-hcaptcha/index.js:47—body: 'response=${token}&secret=${secret}'
PoC
input.recaptcha = 'attacker_token&secret=INJECTED_SECRET&something=1'
→ resulting verify URL:
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api/siteverify?secret=<real>&response=attacker_token&secret=INJECTED_SECRET&something=1
# (replicated exactly from recaptcha.js:39)
Impact
Low: a crafted token smuggles extra key=value pairs (secret, extra response) into the outbound verify call, forcing verification failures (DoS of the captcha gate and of captcha-gated login/form flows) and enabling automated bypass probing; no secret exfiltration.
Remediation — Build the verify request with URL + searchParams (or encodeURIComponent on both secret and response), and validate the token against ^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,2048}$ before use.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @apostrophecms/form | all versions | 1.5.5npm install @apostrophecms/form@1.5.5 |
| 📦npm | @apostrophecms/login-recaptcha | all versions | 1.2.1npm install @apostrophecms/login-recaptcha@1.2.1 |
| 📦npm | @apostrophecms/login-hcaptcha | all versions | 1.3.0npm install @apostrophecms/login-hcaptcha@1.3.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @apostrophecms/form, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @apostrophecms/form to 1.5.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.