GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px
Ratify Azure authentication providers can leak authentication tokens to non-Azure container registries
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/ratify-project/ratify🐹github.com/ratify-project/ratify🐹github.com/deislabs/ratifyReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
In a Kubernetes environment, Ratify can be configured to authenticate to a private Azure Container Registry (ACR). The Azure workload identity and Azure managed identity authentication providers are configured in this setup. Users that configure a private ACR to be used with the Azure authentication providers may be impacted. Both Azure authentication providers attempt to exchange an Entra ID (EID) token for an ACR refresh token. However, Ratify’s Azure authentication providers did not verify that the target registry is an ACR. This could have led to the EID token being presented to a non-ACR registry during token exchange. EID tokens with ACR access can potentially be extracted and abused if a user workload contains an image reference to a malicious registry.
Patches
The Azure workload identity and Azure managed identity authentication providers are updated to add new validation prior to EID token exchange. Validation relies upon registry domain validation against a pre-configured list of well-known ACR endpoints. EID token exchange will be executed only if at least one of the configured well-known domain suffixes (wildcard support included) matches the registry domain of the image reference.
Credits
The ratify project would like to thank Shiwei Zhang (@shizhMSFT) and Binbin Li (@binbin-li) for responsibly disclosing the issue and thank Binbin Li (@binbin-li) and Akash Singhal (@akashsinghal) for actively mitigating the issue.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/ratify-project/ratify | all versions | 1.2.3 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/ratify-project/ratify | ≥ 1.3.0&&< 1.3.2 | 1.3.2 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/deislabs/ratify | all versions | 1.2.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/ratify-project/ratify. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/ratify-project/ratify to 1.2.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.