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GHSA-4486-gxhx-5mg7

MEDIUM

PsySH has Local Privilege Escalation via CWD .psysh.php auto-load

Also known asCVE-2026-25129
Published
Jan 30, 2026
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk20th percentile+0.27%
0.00%0.26%0.52%0.78%0.0%0.3%Feb 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐘psy/psysh🐘psy/psysh

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

PsySH automatically loads and executes a .psysh.php file from the Current Working Directory (CWD) on startup. If an attacker can write to a directory that a victim later uses as their CWD when launching PsySH, the attacker can trigger arbitrary code execution in the victim's context. When the victim runs PsySH with elevated privileges (e.g., root), this results in local privilege escalation.

Details

PsySH supports per-directory configuration via a .psysh.php file located in the process CWD. This file is executed implicitly when PsySH starts, without requiring explicit opt-in and without validating that the file and directory are safe (e.g., owned by the current user and not group/world-writable).

This enables a CWD poisoning scenario: a low-privileged user can plant a malicious .psysh.php in any directory they can write to, then wait for a higher-privileged user to start PsySH while their shell is in that directory.

PoC

  1. As a low-privileged user, create a malicious .psysh.php in an attacker-writable directory (example: /tmp):
bob@localhost:/tmp$ echo "<?php system('id > poc.txt'); ?>" > .psysh.php
bob@localhost:/tmp# ls -lah .psysh.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob bob 33 Jan 28 11:17 .psysh.php
  1. As the victim user, start PsySH with CWD set to that directory and exit:
root@localhost:/tmp# cd /tmp
root@localhost:/tmp# ./psysh
Psy Shell v0.12.18 (PHP 8.1.2-1ubuntu2.23 — cli) by Justin Hileman
New PHP manual is available (latest: 3.0.1). Update with `doc --update-manual`
> exit

   INFO  Goodbye.

  1. Verify code execution triggered in the victim context:
bob@localhost:/tmp$ ls -lah poc.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 39 Jan 28 11:19 poc.txt
bob@localhost:/tmp$ cat poc.txt
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Impact

This is a CWD configuration poisoning issue leading to arbitrary code execution in the victim user’s context. If a privileged user (e.g., root, a CI runner, or an ops/debug account) launches PsySH with CWD set to an attacker-writable directory containing a malicious .psysh.php, the attacker can execute commands with that privileged user’s permissions, resulting in local privilege escalation.

Downstream consumers that embed PsySH inherit this risk. For example, Laravel Tinker (php artisan tinker) uses PsySH. If a privileged user runs Tinker while their shell is in an attacker-writable directory, the .psysh.php auto-load behavior can be abused in the same way to execute attacker-controlled code under the victim’s privileges.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistpsy/psysh0.12.0&&< 0.12.190.12.19
🐘Packagistpsy/psyshall versions0.11.23

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for psy/psysh. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update psy/psysh to 0.12.19 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4486-gxhx-5mg7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-4486-gxhx-5mg7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-4486-gxhx-5mg7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary PsySH automatically loads and executes a `.psysh.php` file from the Current Working Directory (CWD) on startup. If an attacker can write to a directory that a victim later uses as their CWD when launching PsySH, the attacker can trigger arbitrary code execution in the victim's context. When the victim runs PsySH with elevated privileges (e.g., root), this results in local privilege escalation. ### Details PsySH supports per-directory configuration via a `.psysh.php` file located in the process CWD. This file is executed implicitly when PsySH starts, without requiring explicit opt-
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-4486-gxhx-5mg7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-4486-gxhx-5mg7 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.