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hickory-proto: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responsesGHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465

GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465 is a security vulnerability in hickory-proto. A fix is available for hickory-proto — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asRUSTSEC-2026-0118RUSTSEC-2026-0120
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
1 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🦀hickory-proto🦀hickory-net

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in hickory-proto's (0.25.0-alpha.3 ... 0.25.2) and hickory-net's (0.26.0-alpha.1 .. 0.26.0) DnssecDnsHandle walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never terminates, repeatedly calling Name::base_name() and pushing newly allocated Name and hashed-name entries into the candidate Vec.

The bug is reachable by any caller of DnssecDnsHandle, including the resolver, recursor, and client, when built with the dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3 validation.

A debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root()) guards the loop body, so debug builds abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the process exhausts available memory. A reachable upstream attacker who can return such a response can therefore crash a debug build or exhaust memory on a release build, for the affected configurations.

The affected code was migrated from hickory-proto to hickory-net as part of the 0.26.0 release. Hickory DNS recommends that all affected users update to hickory-net 0.26.1 for the fix.

Reporter

David Cook, ISRG

Affected Packages

2 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iohickory-proto≥ 0.25.0-alpha.3No fix
🦀crates.iohickory-net≥ 0.26.0-alpha.1&&< 0.26.10.26.1cargo update -p hickory-net --precise 0.26.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hickory-proto, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    A fix is available for GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465; check the affected-versions list above or the advisory for the patched release of hickory-proto, then make sure no transitive dependency still pins the vulnerable range.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s (0.25.0-alpha.3 ... 0.25.2) and `hickory-net`'s (0.26.0-alpha.1 .. 0.26.0) `DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated `Name` and ha
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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