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tar has a PAX header desynchronization issueGHSA-3pv8-6f4r-ffg2

Fix: composefs/tar-rs#454

GHSA-3pv8-6f4r-ffg2 is a security vulnerability in tar. A fix is available for tar — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀tar

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When a tar stream contains multiple "header" entries prior to a file entry, tar-rs applies the PAX header (x) to the next entry in the stream, regardless of type. For example, a stream of x -> L -> file (PAX, GNU longname, file) would result in x's extensions being applied to L rather than to file.

Per POSIX pax, this is incorrect: a PAX header always applies to a file entry, not any intermediary entries. See the "pax Header Block" section for the specific prescription there.

As a result of this, an attacker can contrive a tar containing a sequence of tar headers such that tar-rs applies the PAX header's size extension to the next header in sequence, effectively desynchronizing the stream and enabling tar-rs specific skippage/extraction of members. In other words, a file can be contrived to extract differently on tar-rs than on other tar parsers.

PoC

This tar (zipped for size) demonstrates the desynchronization: with tar tvf:

% tar tvf tests/archives/pax-overrides-extension-header.tar 
----------  0 0      0        2048 Dec 31  1969 longname.txt
----------  0 0      0           0 Dec 31  1969 file_b

with tar-rs:

---- pax_size_does_not_apply_to_extension_headers stdout ----

thread 'pax_size_does_not_apply_to_extension_headers' (250476889) panicked at tests/all.rs:2121:27:
called `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: Custom { kind: Other, error: "numeric field was not a number: AAAAAAAA when getting cksum for AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" }
note: run with `RUST_BACKTRACE=1` environment variable to display a backtrace

In the above case, the PoC is not weaponized, so it jumps into the middle of an entry and subsequently fails the checksum test rather than silently continuing with attacker-controlled archive state.

Impact

This is very similar to GHSA-j5gw-2vrg-8fgx and GHSA-fp55-jw48-c537 in impact -- an attacker can use this to extract (or not extract) files from a tar stream depending on the tar parser used, which in turn can be used to obscure the presence of malicious files.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iotarall versions0.4.46cargo update -p tar --precise 0.4.46

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tar, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update tar to 0.4.46 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3pv8-6f4r-ffg2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When a tar stream contains multiple "header" entries prior to a file entry, tar-rs applies the PAX header (`x`) to the _next_ entry in the stream, regardless of type. For example, a stream of `x -> L -> file` (PAX, GNU longname, file) would result in `x`'s extensions being applied to `L` rather than to `file`. [Per POSIX pax](https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9799919799/utilities/pax.html), this is incorrect: a PAX header always applies to a file entry, not any intermediary entries. See the "pax Header Block" section for the specific prescription there. As a result of this,
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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tar has a PAX header desynchronization issue