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GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp ash_authentication

Fix: team-alembic/ash_authentication@2640e18

GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp is a Improper Authentication vulnerability in ash_authentication. A fix is available for ash_authentication — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Sign-in token minted for one resource accepted by another in AshAuthentication

Also known asCVE-2026-80218
Published
Sep 17, 2026
Updated
Sep 17, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 17, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
💧ash_authentication

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Hex packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource.

AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2 parses the JWT sub claim (for example user?id=1) with URI.parse/1 and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3 checks the signature, exp, nbf, jti and the library-version claims, the purpose check only requires sign_in, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💧Hexash_authentication3.10.5&&< 4.15.04.15.0mix deps.update ash_authentication

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ash_authentication, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update ash_authentication to 4.15.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource. `AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2` parses the JWT `sub` claim (for example `user?id=1`) with `URI.parse/1` and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: `AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3` checks the signature, `exp`, `nbf`, `j
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp across Hex dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp: ash Auth Bypass | O3 Security