How severe is GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5?

GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 has a CVSS score of 7.5/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5?

GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 affects the following packages: decidim-verifications (RubyGems), decidim-verifications (RubyGems), decidim-verifications (RubyGems). Ecosystems affected: RubyGems.

How do I fix GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5?

Update decidim-verifications to 0.30.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 in my RubyGems dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for decidim-verifications, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Is GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5?

GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.4%, placing it in the 36th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5?

GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 is classified as Information Exposure (CWE-200). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 was published on July 13, 2026 and was last updated on July 13, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

💎

💎 RubyGems

Not in CISA KEV

HIGH severity

Decidim: Verification documents can be downloaded through reusable linksGHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5

HIGHFix: decidim/decidim#16680

GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Information Exposure vulnerability in decidim-verifications. A fix is available for decidim-verifications — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-45378

Published

Jul 13, 2026

Updated

Jul 13, 2026

Affected

3 pkgs

Patched

3 / 3

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs36th percentile — riskier than 36% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected

💎decidim-verifications💎decidim-verifications💎decidim-verifications

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Scanned identity-document images provided by participants and shown in the verification admin workflow are exposed through signed /rails/active_storage/disk/ URLs that can be fetched without any authenticated session.

Anyone who obtains one of those URLs can retrieve the document until the signature expires.

Technical description

This issue comes from the verification admin UI exposing scanned documents through reusable Active Storage disk links. Verification-document images are rendered with variant_url(...), which produces signed /rails/active_storage/disk/... links instead of routing the file through an authorization-checking controller. Because Decidim configures Active Storage service URLs to remain valid for seven days, the URL itself becomes the credential for that period.

The affected files are verification_attachment blobs on Decidim::Authorization, and the admin review pages embed those signed URLs directly into the HTML for pending and confirmation views.

Reproduction steps:

Create a fresh verification document as a normal user. 1.1. Open http://localhost:3001/users/sign_in. 1.2. Open http://localhost:3001/id_documents/authorizations/new. 1.3. Submit an id_documents verification request with an image attachment.
Open the admin review page that renders the attachment. 2.1. Sign out. 2.2. Sign back in as [email protected]. 2.3. Try http://localhost:3001/admin/id_documents.
Harvest the signed Active Storage URL. 3.1. Open DevTools Network before loading the review page. 3.2. Reload the page. 3.3. Copy one request URL matching http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/disk/<SIGNED_TOKEN>/<FILENAME>.
Replay the file URL without any Decidim session. 4.1. Open a private window or a second browser where you are not signed in to Decidim. 4.2. Paste the exact copied /rails/active_storage/disk/... URL. 4.3. Confirm the verification image still loads.

Impact

This only applies to Organizations using the "Identity documents" verification
Any party that obtains one of these URLs can download the underlying scanned identity document for the lifetime of the signed link without needing to authenticate as the reviewing admin.
In the reproduced case, that replay window was about seven days, which is long enough for routine leakage channels such as copied links, screenshots, logs, browser history, and support workflows to become realistic exfiltration paths.
This raises the risk of leakage through browser history, screenshots, copy-paste, support tickets, logs, analytics tooling, malicious browser extensions, or any other channel that captures full URLs.
Because the affected files are identity-verification documents, the exposed data can include highly sensitive personal information.

Patches

See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16680

Workarounds

Disable the "Identity documents" verification

Reference

OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control

Credits

This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
💎RubyGems	`decidim-verifications`	all versions	0.30.9`bundle update decidim-verifications --conservative`
💎RubyGems	`decidim-verifications`	≥ 0.31.0.rc1&&< 0.31.5	0.31.5`bundle update decidim-verifications --conservative`
💎RubyGems	`decidim-verifications`	≥ 0.32.0.rc1&&< 0.32.0	0.32.0`bundle update decidim-verifications --conservative`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for decidim-verifications, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update decidim-verifications to 0.30.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3mvf-82qp-8qh5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Description Scanned identity-document images provided by participants and shown in the verification admin workflow are exposed through signed `/rails/active_storage/disk/` URLs that can be fetched without any authenticated session. Anyone who obtains one of those URLs can retrieve the document until the signature expires. ## Technical description This issue comes from the verification admin UI exposing scanned documents through reusable Active Storage disk links. Verification-document images are rendered with `variant_url(...)`, which produces signed `/rails/active_storage/disk/...` lin