js-toml allows uncontrolled recursion in `load()` leading `RangeError` (stack exhaustion) on deeply nested inputGHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5
MEDIUMFix: sunnyadn/js-toml@4e10acfGHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-674 vulnerability in js-toml. A fix is available for js-toml — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
js-tomlReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
load() parses untrusted TOML using a recursive-descent parser (Chevrotain) and a
recursive tree-walking interpreter. Neither the parser nor the interpreter enforces a
maximum nesting / key depth. A small, attacker-controlled document with deep nesting
(arrays, inline tables) or a long dotted key drives recursion past the V8 call-stack
limit, and load() throws an uncaught RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded.
This is a problem for two reasons:
-
Denial of Service. A tiny payload (≈2 KB) reliably aborts parsing. In any service that parses user-supplied TOML, an unhandled
RangeErrorcan crash the worker/process (500 / restart loop). -
Error-contract violation. The library signals invalid input via
SyntaxParseError(seesrc/load/exception.ts; the entire test suite assertsSyntaxParseError). Consumers that follow this contract —try { load(input); } catch (e) { if (e instanceof SyntaxParseError) return badRequest(); throw e; // unexpected -> propagates }— will re-throw the
RangeErrorinstead of treating the input as malformed, turning malformed input into an unexpected fatal error.
Impact
- Unauthenticated attacker who can supply a TOML string to an application using
js-tomlcan forceload()to throw a non-SyntaxParseErrorerror. - If the error is not caught by a generic handler, the Node.js process terminates (availability impact).
- Even when caught generically, the documented/expected error type contract is broken,
which can bypass input-validation branches that key off
SyntaxParseError.
No confidentiality or integrity impact. The error is thrown synchronously and is catchable, so a consumer that catches all exceptions is not crashed — this is why the severity is assessed Low–Medium rather than High.
Affected code / root cause
There is no depth bound anywhere in the parse pipeline. Recursion occurs in (at least) two independent places:
- Parser (recursive descent).
src/load/parser.ts—array/inlineTablerules recurse throughvaluefor each nesting level. - Interpreter (tree walk).
src/load/interpreter.ts—assignValue,createTable,getOrCreateArrayrecurse per dotted-key segment, andcleanInternalPropertiesrecurses per object depth.
Because there is no configurable or hard limit, the recursion depth is bounded only by
the V8 stack, and overflow surfaces as a raw RangeError.
Steps to reproduce (PoC)
Environment used: Node.js v20, [email protected].
import { load, SyntaxParseError } from 'js-toml';
function probe(label, toml) {
try {
load(toml);
console.log(`[OK] ${label}`);
} catch (e) {
const expected = e instanceof SyntaxParseError;
console.log(`[${e.constructor.name}${expected ? '' : ' (UNEXPECTED)'}] ${label}: ${String(e.message).split('\n')[0]}`);
}
}
// 1) Deeply nested arrays (~2 KB payload)
probe('nested array depth 1000', 'x = ' + '['.repeat(1000) + ']'.repeat(1000));
// 2) Deeply nested inline tables
let v = '1';
for (let i = 0; i < 1000; i++) v = `{ a = ${v} }`;
probe('nested inline table depth 1000', 'x = ' + v);
// 3) Deep dotted key (interpreter recursion)
const key = Array.from({ length: 5000 }, (_, i) => 'a' + i).join('.');
probe('dotted key depth 5000', `${key} = 1`);
Observed output
[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] nested array depth 1000: Maximum call stack size exceeded
[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] nested inline table depth 1000: Maximum call stack size exceeded
[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] dotted key depth 5000: Maximum call stack size exceeded
Each case throws RangeError, not SyntaxParseError. Overflow occurs in single-digit
milliseconds, so it is not a CPU-exhaustion issue — it is an immediate, deterministic abort.
Notes on thresholds (machine-dependent; exact numbers vary by stack size):
- Nested arrays / inline tables overflow at roughly depth ~1000 (parser recursion).
- Dotted keys overflow at roughly depth ~5000 (interpreter recursion); depth 1000 still succeeds.
Suggested remediation
Enforce an explicit, documented maximum nesting/key depth and surface violations as
SyntaxParseError (consistent with all other invalid-input handling). For example:
- Track current depth in the parser/interpreter and throw
SyntaxParseError(e.g."Maximum nesting depth exceeded") once a configurable limit (e.g. 100–1000) is reached, before the native stack overflows. - As a defensive backstop, wrap the top-level
load()body so that a thrownRangeErrorfrom stack exhaustion is converted into aSyntaxParseError, guaranteeing the documented error contract holds for all malformed input.
A configurable limit (with a safe default) is preferable so legitimate deep documents can opt into a higher bound.
Disclosure
Reported privately via GitHub Security Advisory. Happy to provide additional reproducers or test against a candidate patch.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | js-toml | all versions | 1.1.3npm install js-toml@1.1.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for js-toml, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update js-toml to 1.1.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop feeding it untrusted input: reject or quarantine files and payloads from unverified sources until you can upgrade, restrict accepted formats to the ones you actually need, and run the parsing or decoding step in a least-privileged sandbox or short-lived worker so a crash or corrupted read cannot reach the rest of the process.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.