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HIGH severity

Effect `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPCGHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g

HIGH

GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g is a high-severity (CVSS 7.4) CWE-362 vulnerability in effect. A fix is available for effect — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-32887
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.01%
Lower risk than most CVEs21th percentile — riskier than 21% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.26%0.52%0.79%0.0%0.3%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

4Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
effectnpm
66.8Mdownloads / week

Description

Versions

  • effect: 3.19.15
  • @effect/rpc: 0.72.1
  • @effect/platform: 0.94.2
  • Node.js: v22.20.0
  • Vercel runtime with Fluid compute
  • Next.js: 16 (App Router)
  • @clerk/nextjs: 6.x

Root cause

Effect's MixedScheduler batches fiber continuations and drains them inside a single microtask or timer callback. The AsyncLocalStorage context active during that callback belongs to whichever request first triggered the scheduler's drain cycle — not the request that owns the fiber being resumed.

Detailed mechanism

1. Scheduler batching (effect/src/Scheduler.ts, MixedScheduler)

// MixedScheduler.starve() — called once when first task is scheduled
private starve(depth = 0) {
  if (depth >= this.maxNextTickBeforeTimer) {
    setTimeout(() => this.starveInternal(0), 0)       // timer queue
  } else {
    Promise.resolve(void 0).then(() => this.starveInternal(depth + 1)) // microtask queue
  }
}

// MixedScheduler.starveInternal() — drains ALL accumulated tasks in one call
private starveInternal(depth: number) {
  const tasks = this.tasks.buckets
  this.tasks.buckets = []
  for (const [_, toRun] of tasks) {
    for (let i = 0; i < toRun.length; i++) {
      toRun[i]()  // ← Every fiber continuation runs in the SAME ALS context
    }
  }
  // ...
}

scheduleTask only calls starve() when running is false. Subsequent tasks accumulate in this.tasks until starveInternal drains them all. The Promise.then() (or setTimeout) callback inherits the ALS context from whichever call site created it — i.e., whichever request's fiber first set running = true.

Result: Under concurrent load, fiber continuations from Request A and Request B execute inside the same starveInternal call, sharing a single ALS context. If Request A triggered starve(), then Request B's fiber reads Request A's ALS context.

2. toWebHandlerRuntime does not propagate ALS (@effect/platform/src/HttpApp.ts:211-240)

export const toWebHandlerRuntime = <R>(runtime: Runtime.Runtime<R>) => {
  const httpRuntime: Types.Mutable<Runtime.Runtime<R>> = Runtime.make(runtime)
  const run = Runtime.runFork(httpRuntime)
  return <E>(self: Default<E, R | Scope.Scope>, middleware?) => {
    return (request: Request, context?): Promise<Response> =>
      new Promise((resolve) => {
        // Per-request Effect context is correctly set via contextMap:
        const contextMap = new Map<string, any>(runtime.context.unsafeMap)
        const httpServerRequest = ServerRequest.fromWeb(request)
        contextMap.set(ServerRequest.HttpServerRequest.key, httpServerRequest)
        httpRuntime.context = Context.unsafeMake(contextMap)

        // But the fiber is forked without any ALS propagation:
        const fiber = run(httpApp as any)  // ← ALS context is NOT captured or restored
      })
  }
}

Effect's own Context (containing HttpServerRequest) is correctly set per-request. But the Node.js ALS context — which frameworks like Next.js, Clerk, and OpenTelemetry rely on — is not captured at fork time or restored when the fiber's continuations execute.

3. The dangerous pattern this enables

// RPC handler — runs inside an Effect fiber
const handler = Effect.gen(function*() {
  // This calls auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server, which reads from ALS
  const { userId } = yield* Effect.tryPromise({
    try: async () => auth(),  // ← may read WRONG user's session
    catch: () => new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Auth failed" })
  })
  return yield* repository.getUser(userId)
})

The async () => auth() thunk executes when the fiber continuation is scheduled by MixedScheduler. At that point, the ALS context belongs to an arbitrary concurrent request.

Reproduction scenario

Timeline (two concurrent requests to the same toWebHandler endpoint):

T0: Request A arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestA)
    → Promise executor runs synchronously
    → httpRuntime.context set to A's context
    → fiber A forked, runs first ops synchronously
    → fiber A yields (e.g., at Effect.tryPromise boundary)
    → scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberA_continuation)
    → running=false → starve() called → Promise.resolve().then(drain)
       ↑ ALS context captured = Request A's context

T1: Request B arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestB)
    → Promise executor runs synchronously
    → httpRuntime.context set to B's context
    → fiber B forked, runs first ops synchronously
    → fiber B yields
    → scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberB_continuation)
    → running=true → task queued, no new starve()

T2: Microtask fires → starveInternal() runs
    → Drains fiberA_continuation → auth() reads ALS → gets A's context ✓
    → Drains fiberB_continuation → auth() reads ALS → gets A's context ✗ ← WRONG USER

Minimal reproduction

import { AsyncLocalStorage } from "node:async_hooks"
import { Effect, Layer } from "effect"
import { RpcServer, RpcSerialization, Rpc, RpcGroup } from "@effect/rpc"
import { HttpServer } from "@effect/platform"
import * as S from "effect/Schema"

// Simulate a framework's ALS (like Next.js / Clerk)
const requestStore = new AsyncLocalStorage<{ userId: string }>()

class GetUser extends Rpc.make("GetUser", {
  success: S.Struct({ userId: S.String, alsUserId: S.String }),
  failure: S.Never,
  payload: {}
}) {}

const MyRpc = RpcGroup.make("MyRpc").add(GetUser)

const MyRpcLive = MyRpc.toLayer(
  RpcGroup.toHandlers(MyRpc, {
    GetUser: () =>
      Effect.gen(function*() {
        // Simulate calling an ALS-dependent API inside an Effect fiber
        const alsResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({
          try: async () => {
            const store = requestStore.getStore()
            return store?.userId ?? "NONE"
          },
          catch: () => { throw new Error("impossible") }
        })
        return { userId: "from-effect-context", alsUserId: alsResult }
      })
  })
)

const RpcLayer = MyRpcLive.pipe(
  Layer.provideMerge(RpcSerialization.layerJson),
  Layer.provideMerge(HttpServer.layerContext)
)

const { handler } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(MyRpc, { layer: RpcLayer })

// Simulate two concurrent requests with different ALS contexts
async function main() {
  const results = await Promise.all([
    requestStore.run({ userId: "user-A" }, () => handler(makeRpcRequest("GetUser"))),
    requestStore.run({ userId: "user-B" }, () => handler(makeRpcRequest("GetUser"))),
  ])

  // Parse responses and check if alsUserId matches the expected user
  // Under the bug: both responses may show "user-A" (or one shows the other's)
  for (const res of results) {
    console.log(await res.json())
  }
}

Impact

SymptomSeverity
auth() returns wrong user's sessionCritical — authentication bypass
cookies() / headers() from Next.js read wrong requestHigh — data leakage
OpenTelemetry trace context crosses requestsMedium — incorrect traces
Works locally, fails in productionHard to diagnose — only manifests under concurrent load

Workaround

Capture ALS-dependent values before entering the Effect runtime and pass them via Effect's own context system:

// In the route handler — OUTSIDE the Effect fiber (ALS is correct here)
export const POST = async (request: Request) => {
  const { userId } = await auth()  // ← Safe: still in Next.js ALS context

  // Inject into request headers or use the `context` parameter
  const headers = new Headers(request.headers)
  headers.set("x-clerk-auth-user-id", userId ?? "")
  const enrichedRequest = new Request(request.url, {
    method: request.method,
    headers,
    body: request.body,
    duplex: "half" as any,
  })

  return webHandler(enrichedRequest)
}

// In Effect handlers — read from HttpServerRequest headers instead of calling auth()
const getAuthenticatedUserId = Effect.gen(function*() {
  const req = yield* HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest
  const userId = req.headers["x-clerk-auth-user-id"]
  if (!userId) return yield* Effect.fail(new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Auth required" }))
  return userId
})

Suggested fix (for Effect maintainers)

Option A: Propagate ALS context through the scheduler

Capture the AsyncLocalStorage snapshot when a fiber continuation is scheduled, and restore it when the continuation executes:

// In MixedScheduler or the fiber runtime
import { AsyncLocalStorage } from "node:async_hooks"

scheduleTask(task: Task, priority: number) {
  // Capture current ALS context
  const snapshot = AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()
  this.tasks.scheduleTask(() => snapshot(task), priority)
  // ...
}

AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot() (Node.js 20.5+) returns a function that, when called, restores the ALS context from the point of capture. This ensures each fiber continuation runs with its originating request's ALS context.

Trade-off: Adds one closure allocation per scheduled task. Could be opt-in via a FiberRef or scheduler option.

Option B: Capture ALS at runFork and restore per fiber step

When Runtime.runFork is called, capture the ALS snapshot and associate it with the fiber. Before each fiber step (in the fiber runtime's evaluateEffect loop), restore the snapshot.

Trade-off: More invasive but provides correct ALS propagation for the fiber's entire lifetime, including across flatMap chains and Effect.tryPromise thunks.

Option C: Document the limitation and provide a context injection API

If ALS propagation is intentionally not supported, document this prominently and provide a first-class API for toWebHandler to accept per-request context. The existing context?: Context.Context<never> parameter on the handler function partially addresses this, but it requires callers to know about the issue and manually extract values before entering Effect.

Related

POC replica of my setup

// Create web handler from Effect RPC
// sharedMemoMap ensures all RPC routes share the same connection pool
const { handler: webHandler, dispose } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(DemoRpc, {
  layer: RpcLayer,
  memoMap: sharedMemoMap,
});

/**
 * POST /api/rpc/demo
 */
export const POST = async (request: Request) => {
  return webHandler(request);
};

registerDispose(dispose);

Used util functions


/**
 * Creates a dispose registry that collects dispose callbacks and runs them
 * when `runAll` is invoked. Handles both sync and async dispose functions,
 * catching errors to prevent one failing dispose from breaking others.
 *
 * @internal Exported for testing — use `registerDispose` in application code.
 */
export const makeDisposeRegistry = () => {
  const disposeFns: Array<() => void | Promise<void>> = []

  const runAll = () => {
    for (const fn of disposeFns) {
      try {
        const result = fn()
        if (result && typeof result.then === "function") {
          result.then(undefined, (err: unknown) => console.error("Dispose error:", err))
        }
      } catch (err) {
        console.error("Dispose error:", err)
      }
    }
  }

  const register = (dispose: () => void | Promise<void>) => {
    disposeFns.push(dispose)
  }

  return { register, runAll }
}

export const registerDispose: (dispose: () => void | Promise<void>) => void = globalValue(
  Symbol.for("@global/RegisterDispose"),
  () => {
    const registry = makeDisposeRegistry()

    if (typeof process !== "undefined") {
      process.once("beforeExit", registry.runAll)
    }

    return registry.register
  }
)

The actual effect that was run within the RPC context that the bug was found

export const getAuthenticatedUserId: Effect.Effect<string, UnauthorizedError> =
  Effect.gen(function*() {
    const authResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({
      try: async () => auth(),
      catch: () =>
        new UnauthorizedError({
          message: "Failed to get auth session"
        })
    })

    if (!authResult.userId) {
      return yield* Effect.fail(
        new UnauthorizedError({
          message: "Authentication required"
        })
      )
    }

    return authResult.userId
  })

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmeffectall versions3.20.0npm install effect@3.20.0

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
effecteffectful
< 3.20.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for effect, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update effect to 3.20.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Versions - `effect`: 3.19.15 - `@effect/rpc`: 0.72.1 - `@effect/platform`: 0.94.2 - Node.js: v22.20.0 - Vercel runtime with Fluid compute - Next.js: 16 (App Router) - `@clerk/nextjs`: 6.x ## Root cause Effect's `MixedScheduler` batches fiber continuations and drains them inside a **single** microtask or timer callback. The `AsyncLocalStorage` context active during that callback belongs to whichever request first triggered the scheduler's drain cycle — **not** the request that owns the fiber being resumed. ### Detailed mechanism #### 1. Scheduler batching (`effect/src/Scheduler.ts`, `Mi
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