GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g — effect
HIGHGHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g is a high-severity (CVSS 7.4) CWE-362 vulnerability in effect. A fix is available for effect — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Effect `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
effectnpmDescription
Versions
effect: 3.19.15@effect/rpc: 0.72.1@effect/platform: 0.94.2- Node.js: v22.20.0
- Vercel runtime with Fluid compute
- Next.js: 16 (App Router)
@clerk/nextjs: 6.x
Root cause
Effect's MixedScheduler batches fiber continuations and drains them inside a single microtask or timer callback. The AsyncLocalStorage context active during that callback belongs to whichever request first triggered the scheduler's drain cycle — not the request that owns the fiber being resumed.
Detailed mechanism
1. Scheduler batching (effect/src/Scheduler.ts, MixedScheduler)
// MixedScheduler.starve() — called once when first task is scheduled
private starve(depth = 0) {
if (depth >= this.maxNextTickBeforeTimer) {
setTimeout(() => this.starveInternal(0), 0) // timer queue
} else {
Promise.resolve(void 0).then(() => this.starveInternal(depth + 1)) // microtask queue
}
}
// MixedScheduler.starveInternal() — drains ALL accumulated tasks in one call
private starveInternal(depth: number) {
const tasks = this.tasks.buckets
this.tasks.buckets = []
for (const [_, toRun] of tasks) {
for (let i = 0; i < toRun.length; i++) {
toRun[i]() // ← Every fiber continuation runs in the SAME ALS context
}
}
// ...
}
scheduleTask only calls starve() when running is false. Subsequent tasks accumulate in this.tasks until starveInternal drains them all. The Promise.then() (or setTimeout) callback inherits the ALS context from whichever call site created it — i.e., whichever request's fiber first set running = true.
Result: Under concurrent load, fiber continuations from Request A and Request B execute inside the same starveInternal call, sharing a single ALS context. If Request A triggered starve(), then Request B's fiber reads Request A's ALS context.
2. toWebHandlerRuntime does not propagate ALS (@effect/platform/src/HttpApp.ts:211-240)
export const toWebHandlerRuntime = <R>(runtime: Runtime.Runtime<R>) => {
const httpRuntime: Types.Mutable<Runtime.Runtime<R>> = Runtime.make(runtime)
const run = Runtime.runFork(httpRuntime)
return <E>(self: Default<E, R | Scope.Scope>, middleware?) => {
return (request: Request, context?): Promise<Response> =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
// Per-request Effect context is correctly set via contextMap:
const contextMap = new Map<string, any>(runtime.context.unsafeMap)
const httpServerRequest = ServerRequest.fromWeb(request)
contextMap.set(ServerRequest.HttpServerRequest.key, httpServerRequest)
httpRuntime.context = Context.unsafeMake(contextMap)
// But the fiber is forked without any ALS propagation:
const fiber = run(httpApp as any) // ← ALS context is NOT captured or restored
})
}
}
Effect's own Context (containing HttpServerRequest) is correctly set per-request. But the Node.js ALS context — which frameworks like Next.js, Clerk, and OpenTelemetry rely on — is not captured at fork time or restored when the fiber's continuations execute.
3. The dangerous pattern this enables
// RPC handler — runs inside an Effect fiber
const handler = Effect.gen(function*() {
// This calls auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server, which reads from ALS
const { userId } = yield* Effect.tryPromise({
try: async () => auth(), // ← may read WRONG user's session
catch: () => new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Auth failed" })
})
return yield* repository.getUser(userId)
})
The async () => auth() thunk executes when the fiber continuation is scheduled by MixedScheduler. At that point, the ALS context belongs to an arbitrary concurrent request.
Reproduction scenario
Timeline (two concurrent requests to the same toWebHandler endpoint):
T0: Request A arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestA)
→ Promise executor runs synchronously
→ httpRuntime.context set to A's context
→ fiber A forked, runs first ops synchronously
→ fiber A yields (e.g., at Effect.tryPromise boundary)
→ scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberA_continuation)
→ running=false → starve() called → Promise.resolve().then(drain)
↑ ALS context captured = Request A's context
T1: Request B arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestB)
→ Promise executor runs synchronously
→ httpRuntime.context set to B's context
→ fiber B forked, runs first ops synchronously
→ fiber B yields
→ scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberB_continuation)
→ running=true → task queued, no new starve()
T2: Microtask fires → starveInternal() runs
→ Drains fiberA_continuation → auth() reads ALS → gets A's context ✓
→ Drains fiberB_continuation → auth() reads ALS → gets A's context ✗ ← WRONG USER
Minimal reproduction
import { AsyncLocalStorage } from "node:async_hooks"
import { Effect, Layer } from "effect"
import { RpcServer, RpcSerialization, Rpc, RpcGroup } from "@effect/rpc"
import { HttpServer } from "@effect/platform"
import * as S from "effect/Schema"
// Simulate a framework's ALS (like Next.js / Clerk)
const requestStore = new AsyncLocalStorage<{ userId: string }>()
class GetUser extends Rpc.make("GetUser", {
success: S.Struct({ userId: S.String, alsUserId: S.String }),
failure: S.Never,
payload: {}
}) {}
const MyRpc = RpcGroup.make("MyRpc").add(GetUser)
const MyRpcLive = MyRpc.toLayer(
RpcGroup.toHandlers(MyRpc, {
GetUser: () =>
Effect.gen(function*() {
// Simulate calling an ALS-dependent API inside an Effect fiber
const alsResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({
try: async () => {
const store = requestStore.getStore()
return store?.userId ?? "NONE"
},
catch: () => { throw new Error("impossible") }
})
return { userId: "from-effect-context", alsUserId: alsResult }
})
})
)
const RpcLayer = MyRpcLive.pipe(
Layer.provideMerge(RpcSerialization.layerJson),
Layer.provideMerge(HttpServer.layerContext)
)
const { handler } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(MyRpc, { layer: RpcLayer })
// Simulate two concurrent requests with different ALS contexts
async function main() {
const results = await Promise.all([
requestStore.run({ userId: "user-A" }, () => handler(makeRpcRequest("GetUser"))),
requestStore.run({ userId: "user-B" }, () => handler(makeRpcRequest("GetUser"))),
])
// Parse responses and check if alsUserId matches the expected user
// Under the bug: both responses may show "user-A" (or one shows the other's)
for (const res of results) {
console.log(await res.json())
}
}
Impact
| Symptom | Severity |
|---|---|
auth() returns wrong user's session | Critical — authentication bypass |
cookies() / headers() from Next.js read wrong request | High — data leakage |
| OpenTelemetry trace context crosses requests | Medium — incorrect traces |
| Works locally, fails in production | Hard to diagnose — only manifests under concurrent load |
Workaround
Capture ALS-dependent values before entering the Effect runtime and pass them via Effect's own context system:
// In the route handler — OUTSIDE the Effect fiber (ALS is correct here)
export const POST = async (request: Request) => {
const { userId } = await auth() // ← Safe: still in Next.js ALS context
// Inject into request headers or use the `context` parameter
const headers = new Headers(request.headers)
headers.set("x-clerk-auth-user-id", userId ?? "")
const enrichedRequest = new Request(request.url, {
method: request.method,
headers,
body: request.body,
duplex: "half" as any,
})
return webHandler(enrichedRequest)
}
// In Effect handlers — read from HttpServerRequest headers instead of calling auth()
const getAuthenticatedUserId = Effect.gen(function*() {
const req = yield* HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest
const userId = req.headers["x-clerk-auth-user-id"]
if (!userId) return yield* Effect.fail(new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Auth required" }))
return userId
})
Suggested fix (for Effect maintainers)
Option A: Propagate ALS context through the scheduler
Capture the AsyncLocalStorage snapshot when a fiber continuation is scheduled, and restore it when the continuation executes:
// In MixedScheduler or the fiber runtime
import { AsyncLocalStorage } from "node:async_hooks"
scheduleTask(task: Task, priority: number) {
// Capture current ALS context
const snapshot = AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()
this.tasks.scheduleTask(() => snapshot(task), priority)
// ...
}
AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot() (Node.js 20.5+) returns a function that, when called, restores the ALS context from the point of capture. This ensures each fiber continuation runs with its originating request's ALS context.
Trade-off: Adds one closure allocation per scheduled task. Could be opt-in via a FiberRef or scheduler option.
Option B: Capture ALS at runFork and restore per fiber step
When Runtime.runFork is called, capture the ALS snapshot and associate it with the fiber. Before each fiber step (in the fiber runtime's evaluateEffect loop), restore the snapshot.
Trade-off: More invasive but provides correct ALS propagation for the fiber's entire lifetime, including across flatMap chains and Effect.tryPromise thunks.
Option C: Document the limitation and provide a context injection API
If ALS propagation is intentionally not supported, document this prominently and provide a first-class API for toWebHandler to accept per-request context. The existing context?: Context.Context<never> parameter on the handler function partially addresses this, but it requires callers to know about the issue and manually extract values before entering Effect.
Related
- Node.js
AsyncLocalStoragedocs: https://nodejs.org/api/async_context.html AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot(): https://nodejs.org/api/async_context.html#static-method-asynclocalstoragesnapshot- Next.js uses ALS for
cookies(),headers(),auth()in App Router - Similar issue pattern in other fiber-based runtimes (e.g., ZIO has
FiberRefpropagation for this)
POC replica of my setup
// Create web handler from Effect RPC
// sharedMemoMap ensures all RPC routes share the same connection pool
const { handler: webHandler, dispose } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(DemoRpc, {
layer: RpcLayer,
memoMap: sharedMemoMap,
});
/**
* POST /api/rpc/demo
*/
export const POST = async (request: Request) => {
return webHandler(request);
};
registerDispose(dispose);
Used util functions
/**
* Creates a dispose registry that collects dispose callbacks and runs them
* when `runAll` is invoked. Handles both sync and async dispose functions,
* catching errors to prevent one failing dispose from breaking others.
*
* @internal Exported for testing — use `registerDispose` in application code.
*/
export const makeDisposeRegistry = () => {
const disposeFns: Array<() => void | Promise<void>> = []
const runAll = () => {
for (const fn of disposeFns) {
try {
const result = fn()
if (result && typeof result.then === "function") {
result.then(undefined, (err: unknown) => console.error("Dispose error:", err))
}
} catch (err) {
console.error("Dispose error:", err)
}
}
}
const register = (dispose: () => void | Promise<void>) => {
disposeFns.push(dispose)
}
return { register, runAll }
}
export const registerDispose: (dispose: () => void | Promise<void>) => void = globalValue(
Symbol.for("@global/RegisterDispose"),
() => {
const registry = makeDisposeRegistry()
if (typeof process !== "undefined") {
process.once("beforeExit", registry.runAll)
}
return registry.register
}
)
The actual effect that was run within the RPC context that the bug was found
export const getAuthenticatedUserId: Effect.Effect<string, UnauthorizedError> =
Effect.gen(function*() {
const authResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({
try: async () => auth(),
catch: () =>
new UnauthorizedError({
message: "Failed to get auth session"
})
})
if (!authResult.userId) {
return yield* Effect.fail(
new UnauthorizedError({
message: "Authentication required"
})
)
}
return authResult.userId
})
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | effect | all versions | 3.20.0npm install effect@3.20.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for effect, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update effect to 3.20.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.